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The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in
the World's Premier Fish Market
Eric A. Feldmant
Abstract
Legal scholars have long emphasized the corrosive impact of conflict
on long-term commercial and interpersonal relationships. To minimize the
negative consequences of such conflict, members of close-knit groups who
anticipate future interactions create "Yvays to resolve their disputes using
internal group norms rather than stare-enforced legal rules. From farmers
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in Cal[lorniu 's Shasfo Count}.! to jewelers in lJIidfUwn iv[anho{(un," fhe lit-
eratllre describes people who creote inlormed norms of conflict lrlCll7(Jge-
ment thut are/aster and less expensive than formal IU\l' und that lessen the
harm that conflict cOllses to their relationships.
This Article fells (/ diflerent stOlY. it describe.'-; a tightlv organized
group of commercial traders-tuna merchants in Tokyo H'ho are repeat
players in a discrete marketplace H'here there are regular problems with
the quality 0/ auctioned goods. Rather than ignoring fho.<;e problems or
quiet(v resolving them H'ith reference to in}onnal market norms, Tokyo's
tuna merchants make use of a high(v specialized court created by the
state-the Tuna Court-that follows }ormal rules and procedures that are
contained in a government ordinance, The supposed disadvantages ollega!
rules are nov'v'here apparent, The Tuna Court is fast and inexpensive, and
the process ol articulating and resolving claims serves to strengthen indi-
vidual relations and the cohesion ol the market community. A comparison
between Japan and the United States demonstrates that there is more dis-
puting and more legal formality in the Japanese tuna market, and this
Article credits a mix (~leconomicand culturalfactorsfor the difference. in
short, by presenting a detailed case study ofa highly specialized court that
operates under government auspices, this Article argues that formal state
lavv can outperform informal group norms by sati.~fying the business needs
of close-knit merchants while sirnultaneous(v contributing to the shared
values that underlie the success oltheirfllture transactions.
INTRODUCTION
A path-breaking examination of California cattle ranchers argues that
members of close-knit communities prefer to resolve their conflicts with
reference to infonnal norms3 rather than fonnal legal rules or procedures."
I. See ROHERT C. EU.lCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTL.E DISPUTES
(1991 ).
2. See Lisa Bemstein, Opling Out of the Legol Syslem.· EXlralegal COnlracllIal Relations in the
Diamond indusliy, 21 J. LEG,\L STUD. 115 (1992).
3. Although the word "nonn" is widely used in contemporary legal scholarship, it has no
uniformly accepted definition. Eric Posner, for example, writes that "[a] norm can be understood as a
rule that distinguishes desirable and undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to punish
a person who engages in the undesirable behavior," Eric A. Posner, L(I\\', Economics. and ineffiCient
Norms, 144 U. PA. L REV. 1697, 1699 (1996). More recently, Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico
have defined "nonns" as "rules of conduct that constrain self·interested behavior and that are adopted
and enforced in an infonnal. decentralized setting." Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico,
Competing Norms Gnd Social Evolution.' fs the Fittest Norm EUicien(l 149 U. PA. L REV. 2027, 2030
(200 I). Richard McAdams argues that nonns are "informal social regularities [hat individuals feel
obligated to follow because of an intemalized sense of duty, because of a fear of extemal non-legal
sanctions, or both." Richard II. McAdams, The Origin, Del'elopmenl, (//1(1 Regulation of Norms, 96
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Similarly, an influential analysis of the diamond industry concludes that a
system of nonns prevails among traders because of "its ability to quickly
resolve disputes and enforce judgments-results that cannot be obtained
through the legal system."5 Those studies-both emphasizing that people
in close-knit groups rely on infonnal norms because they value their future
relationships and consider fOID1al legal processes destructively adversar-
ial6-have inspired an outpouring of scholarly writings. 7 Yet few
MICH. L REV. 338,340 (1997). In this paper. J emphasize the informal, non-legal nature of nOllllS and
norm en forcement.
4. ELI.lCKSO:-l, supra note 1, at 167. The jacket copy of the book makes the point less elegantly
but more directly, announcing that "law is far less imponan! than is generally thought" because "people
largely govern themselves by means of infoIlllal rules-social nonns--that develop without the aid of a
state or other central coordinator." See also Lewis A. Komhauser, Are There Cracks in rhe Foundarion
oj Spol1raneous Order? 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 647, 652 (J 992) (reviewing ELI.JCKSO, • supra note I).
ciling as Ellickson's central hypothesis the claim that members of close-knit groups govern themselves
through infOimal nonns "whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain
III their workaday affairs with one another." Edward Rock and Michael Wachter concur. noting that
"Ulickson's basic claim is that nonns arise in close-knit groups. and that the norms controlling the
workaday relationship of such groups will enhance overall welfare" Edward B. Rock & Michael L
Wachter. The En!orceahi!iry 01' Norms and rhe Emp!ol'lnenr Re!arionship, 144 U. PA. L RF\' 1913.
1916 (1996).
5. Bernstein, supra note 2, at J 16. Summarizing the literature, Robert Cooter writes that
"[e]mpirical studies of community life and business practice have often concluded that informal
sanctions arc more imponant than the law in enforcing norms." Robel1 D. Cooter, SrrIlClum!
.-J.diudicoriol1 and rhe Nell' Law Merchanr: A Mode'l 01' Decel7lra!ized LalL 14 INT'L REV. L & EUIN.
215,223 (1994).
6. As Mahoney and Sanchirico point out. there is a normative underCUlTeIll to this claim: some
scholars. they suggest, "express a tentative optimism tJlat socially desirable. or efficient. practices can
arise from the interactions of decentrali7.:ed. utility-maximizing IndiViduals." Paul G. Mahonev & Chris
W. Sanchirico, Compering Norms and Social E1'()!urion.· 1.1' rhe Fillt:st Norm I:}jicien(/ 14LJ L'. PA. L
REV. 2027, 2028 (2001) Although it may on occasion be true that informal nOllllS are normatively
superior to legal rules, there is no reason to think that is necessarily, or generally, the case. As GalanteI'
indicates. indigenous (informal) law is not "more virtuous or more efficient than official la\\·. .. It
often reflects nalTow and parochial concellls: it is often based on relations of domination: ils
coerciveness may be harsh and indiscriminate: rrotections that are available In public forums may be
absent." Marc Galanter. Jllsrict: in Many Rooms COUrls. Privme Ordering. and Indigenous rl/lL 19 .I.
LEG."L PUJRALIS 1 1,25 (1981).
7. In a steady now of books and articles. legal scholars have devotcd themselves to expl iC;.j[ing
the meaning of "norms," theorizing about why people abide by nonns. and analyzing the e!'ticiency of
norms. See. e.g., Mahoney & Sanchirieo_ slipra note 3. at 12X3 (to demonstrate that "social norms. not
legal rules. are the mainstay of social control. . requires a theory of why indiViduals would follow
norms against their immediate self-interesl without threat of formal legal sanction"): McAdams. SlIjJUI
note 3 (H[T]here is as yet no consensus about ccrtain basic theoretical propositions, includiOlg. most
Imponantly_ the meaning of norm. My goal is to remedy some fundamental ambiguities in the tellll
I/oI'm."): Posner. Sllprl1 note 3: Barak D. Richman_ Firms. COllrts. ond Repllrl/rion
Mechanisms. T(}\wrds 0 Posiril'<! Theon o/Primrl' Ordering. 104 COLUM. L REV. 2328.2330 (2004)
("This Essay's primary objective is to begin formulating a positi\'e model that predicls when one
should expect to see systems of private law"). SOllle particularly imponant contributions to the 1,1\\' and
nOllllS literature are ERIC .A. Pos. ER_ L\ \\. A~D SOCIAL N(JR~·ts (2000); Svmposium. 1.oil·. /:·cOn()/IIl,·S.
& Norms, 144 U. PA. L RH·. 1643 (1996): <;ymposium. The Ll!ga! COl1slruuion o(Nortlls_ :-t6 VA. L
REV. ] "77 (2000). Although infonnal social norm" arc of gro\\ing interest among eontelllporaJ'\ legal
scholars. the Issues being addressed are not nc\\'o l\S Rock and Wachter nole. "The discussion or the
relation between norms or CUSlOlll and la\\' is. of course. one o( the ancient debates of thL' 1;\\\.
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subsequent empirical investigations have informed the discussion of
whether, when, or why informal norms rather than state-created law prevail
in certain settings.~
Based on a detailed analysis of Japanese traders at the Tokyo Central
Wholesale Market's tuna auction (hereinafter Tsukiji, the name of the
neighborhood where the market is located), this Article utilizes the case-
based method that provided earlier studies with their analytical and rhetori-
cal bite. It interrogates the claim that norms will trump law within particu-
lar types of groups by looking at a small, close-knit, specialized merchant
community,'l trading a product (tuna) with cultural resonance, within a
marketplace inscribed by local values, in a nation where recourse to fonnal
legal institutions is often discouraged. lo Under this set of conditions,
stretching back centuries'" Rock & Wachter, supra note 4, at 1914 n.l; see also Steven N.S. Cheung.
The Fable of the Bees. An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. II (1973). Law and society
scholars have long emphasized how repeat business players avoided formal contlict because it
negatively affects the possibility of maintaining a hlture relationship. See Galanter, supra note 6:
Stewart Macaulay, Non-CuntraclUa! Relations in Business: A PreliminQ/)' Stuc(v. 2g /\V1. Soc:. REV. 55
(1963). I onns have also played an important role in work of the prominent sociologists. See. e.g., MAX
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1958).
8. Indeed. although the legal scholarship on nonns has become increasingly theoretically
sophisticated, the most provocative thesis (what I will call the "bold" claim) suggested by the case
studies of Ellickson and Bernstein· not simply that people may resolve their disputes cooperatively
and ignore the law, but that informal nonns rather than state-created law \Vi!! order the relationships of
members of close-knit groups-has remained largely unexamined, even though it is particularly suited
to empirical evaluation. If scholars understood the studies of Ellickson and Bernstein to suggest only
that non115 can be important. it would be difficult to explain their impact. As Ellickson points out, "[i]n
contrast to the law-and-economics scholars, law-and-society scholars have long been aware that nonns
and self-help play important roles in coordinating human affairs." ELLICKSON, supra note l. at 147. In
contrast to the view that either law or norms may order relationships, therefore, I emphasize the "bold"
claim-that is, that in certain settings like close-knit communities, norms rather t!lOIl law will order
relationships. In other words. just as Ellickson critiqued legal scholars for their belief in "legal
centralism," I am concerned with the "norm centralism" that some have put in its place.
9. According to Ellickson. "[aJ group is close-knit when infonnal power is broadly distributed
among group members and the infonnation pertinent to informal control circulates easily alllong them."
ELLICKSO:'-1, supra note 1. at 177-n. He acknowledges that the "vagueness of this delinition is
unavoidable" due to the wide variety of social environments, so that a group like Shasta County
residents are close-knit while those living on a small isolated island arc "extremely" close-knit. Ed
Tokyo's tuna merchants are perhaps closer to California fanners than residents ofa remote island. They
trade with each other daily; they jointly attend professional education seminars; they work within the
same discrete marketplace; they are often members of families that have worked in the runa trade for
generations; they spend their break time and free time socializing in a small number of inner-market
cafes and restaurants; their economic well-being is interdependent; and they can punish and reward
each other. One element of the trading community is notable for its absence-tuna owners, who are
represented by sellers but are themselves not present in the Tsukiji marketplace. For a detailed
description of the careers and interactions of tuna traders. see THEODORE C. BESTOR. TSUKIJI: THE FISH
MARKET AT THE CENTER OF THE WORLD (2004).
10. Although there is a lively debate among scholars of Japanese law about how to explain
Japan's low frequency of litigation, there is unanimity about the underlying fact to be explained-the
Japanese are far less likely than Americans to resolve their claims through the f0l111al legal system. For
publications rejecting the view that the Japanese are unusually averse to contlict. see ERIC A.
FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS It' JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH POLICY (2000); JOH.
OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOl;T POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991): J. MARK
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existing theories would expect nonns to flourish. Through its investigation
of conflicts among Tokyo's tuna traders, this Article makes five distinct
contributions to the literature on law, n01111S, and dispute resolution in
close-knit business communities. II
First, the Article offers the only analysis In English or Japanese of
how merchants at the world's biggest tuna auction handle contlict. l :'
Although one must be modest about the reach of findings from any indi-
vidual case study, comparison across cases is well suited to examining the
evolution and resolution of conflict within discrete communities. 13 By add-
ing a non-U.S. perspective to the debate over law and nonns l4 and by mak-
ing it possible to triangulate the analyses of cattle ranchers and diamond
RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPA 'ESE LAW: A Eco OMIC ApPROACH (1999); FRA 'K K.
UPHAM. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). For a cultural explanation of low
litigation rates, see Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL
ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur Taylor Von Mehren cd., 1963); for an explanation thai
emphasizes institutional barriers to litigation, see John Owen Haley, The A{vth of the Reluclant Litigw71.
4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359-89 (1978); for an explanation thaI highlights the predictability of Japanese
courts, sec J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Rel'isited: Rationalitv and Dispwes in Japan. 14 J.
JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988). Nowhere in the literature on Ihe Japanese legal system does one find a
claim Ihat for cultural or institutional reasons there is less reliance on norms in Japan than elsewhcre.
Japan thereforc provides an environment in which the reliance on nonns is likely to be at least as stlllng
as. and perhaps stronger than, in the Unitcd States.
II. In fact. as will be discussed below. there are far more disputes at Ihe Tokyo tuna auction than
in the groups studied by Ellickson and Bernstcin. Lisa Bcrnstein's study of disputes in the cotton trade.
for example, involves two disputes each year, and her study of diamond dealers involves 150 disputes
per year. See l:3ernstein, supra note 2; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial J~O\\' in rhe Co{{on
JndUSIIT' Crearing Cooperarionthrough Rules, Nurms, und Jnsrirurions, 99 MICH. L REV. 1724 (200 I l.
A potcntially interesting clement of l:3eIllstein's work on diamond dealers is that the largest and most
valuable stones are sold at auction rather than through the exchange that is the focus of her study.
Bernstein, supra note 2. at 143. It is not clear whether the required arbitration system applies to
disputes that arise from those sales.
12. There arc books that discuss the operations of Japanese fish markets, some of whieh focus on
Tsukiji. but none discuss the conflicts that arise O\Tr auctioned tuna. The most comprehensive history
is OIW~HtURI SHIH) SEJDO GOJYONE, -SHI HE~SAN IINKA!. OROSHllJRI SHIJO SEIDO GOJYC''JE~ Slil
("./\ Fifty Year History of the Wholesale Market System:' (, volumes) (Tokyo: Shokuhin Jvukyll
KenkYll Scnta 1979), with volume 5 (Oroslriuri Shijl) Go})unl'n no AvulJli Tokei [Fijll' }'('urs "I'
Sroris/ie's oho/lr rlre Wholl'sole Morker]. 1978) being panicularly interesting. For two recent additions to
the literature. sec LIEDA T"'KESHI. UOCASHI 1MoURO KEl7.;\IGAKU [A:"! Ern OMIC STUIlY OF TilE
TI't'" MARKET] (Tokyo: ShOeisha Shinsho 2003): KOllAYASHI 1ITSURU, TSUKIJI "0 SliIKIl,\KI (THE
Rill'.\( S ()I TSUKIJI) ITokvo: NHK 2003). An excellent English language ethnography of Tsukiji is
RESTOR, supra note 9.
I:; Richman observes that the literature on law and norms is "rich for theoretical dC\elopment"
because it is a rehlfively new area of research, and it "contains genuinely intcresting stories." Richman .
.1'111",0 nole 7. at 2333-34.
14. There have been a number of studies of law and norms outside the United States. but the\' arc
not easily compared to the studies by Elliekson and BClllstein. Some are hlstoricallv distalll S",e. eg..
A\ner (jreif. C"!7rrucr E!7jiJrc('ohilin' ond Eco!7omic J!7srirllrions in Forll' Trude.' The ;\foghrihi
Tmd<-Ts' COUtiI/OIl. ~3 AM. ErnN. RI'.v. 525 (1993). Others focus on nations with "dysfunctionar- legal
systems. Sel!. e.g.. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, PrilD/e Order Lindl!r Dn,/llI1crio!7ul FilMic
Ord,·r. 9>< ~1«,H. L Ihv. 2421 (2000).
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dealers,') this study significantly expands the empirical base of the
law/nonns debate.
Second, and contrary to previous case studies, the Article demon-
strates that members of close-knit groups may tum to law rather than
norms because legal rules and institutions can be breathtakingly fast and
inexpensive. Contliets over auctioned tuna are brought to Tsukiji's Tuna
Court (the more technical tenn is Jiko Kensa-sho, "Accident Inspection
Place"), whieh was created by and is controlled by the government. The
Court is located within the state-owned marketplace, so it is easily accessi-
ble to the parties. It is quick, dispensing judgments in sessions that last
only fifteen minutes. It satisfies the parties by providing buyers with price
reductions when judges detennine that they purchased a damaged fish, and
by allowing sellers '6 to take paIi in the adjudication process. And it im-
poses only modest costs on disputants.
Third, the evidence in this Article indicates that the Tsukiji market-
place is rife with disputes between merchants whose work brings them into
daily contact. Yet in contrast to the view that frequent face-to-face conflict
is likely to undermine future dealings and is thus studiously avoided, mar-
ket relationships remain strong. Conflicts arise at Tsukiji's tuna auction
when buyers purchase a tuna that turns out to be diseased or blemished-or
for some other reason is perceived by the buyer to be worth less than ex-
pected. Although such problems are frequent and inevitable because the
condition of fish is naturally varied, tuna merchants do not rely on caveat
emptor to eliminate the need to adjudicate individual problems. 17 They in-
stead bring seven thousand claims each year to a specialized
15. With the exception of studies that analyze the resolution of connict over automobile
accidents. there are few analyses of specific out-of-court dispute-processing systems in Japan, and there
are even fewer that foclls on the interaction of law and norms. The classic study of automobile
accidents is Takao Tanase. The /vlanagement or Disputes: .-lutolllohile Accidem Compensation in
Japan, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 651 (1990). An interesting study of dispute resolution is Mark West's
study of noise-related complaints involving karaoke clubs. Mark D. West, The Resolution of Karaoke
Displlles: The Calculus of Institutions and Social Capital, 28 J. J,-\PA:-JESE STUD. 30 I (2002). Frank
Upham describes the origins of the Law for the Resolution of Pollution Disputes in UPHAM, supra note
10, at 58-59. For a study of law and norms within Japan's sumo wrestling community, see Mark D.
West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World o/Sumo, 26.1. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997),
and for an analysis of norms in the context of corporate govemance. see Curtis J, Milhaupt, Creative
Norm Destruction: The Emlution orNonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2083 (200 I). For a discussion of comparative methodology and Iriangulation, see HARRY
ECKSTEI". REGAROlNG POI.ITlCS: ESSAYS 0, POLITICAL THEORY. Sr..>,BILITY. AND CHANGE (1992).
16. In this Articlc, I refer to auctioneers as sellers, In fact. like most auctioneers, they serve as
agents or brokers for tuna suppliers, but they do not own the tuna themselves.
17, The maxim c(I\'e"t emptor entered the popular legal lexicon in sixteenth-century England. It
refers to the doctrine that purchasers of real property are responsible for evaluating the quality of the
land and the soundness of the title, The full phrase is caveat emptor, qllia ignorure 110n debuit quodjus
alienum emit, or "let a purchaser beware. for he ought nol to be ignorant of the nature of the property
which he is buying frol11 another party." For a detailed discussion or C(/l'cut emptor in commercial law,
see Walton H. Hamilton. The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptur, 40 YALE L.J. 11.33 (1931).
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dispute-resolution body-the Tuna Court-and demand a reduction in the
price of their winning auction bid. 18 Their claims do not corrode market
relations; to the contrary, they help market pariicipants to assert and refine
their expertise, adjust the balance of power between buyers and sellers, and
reaffilm a shared notion of fairness by spreading the risks of unknowable
quality defects to all parties. Members of the tuna trade continue to buy and
sell from each other, and they are able to quickly and profitably move
thousands of tuna through the market daily. Like all couris, therefore, the
Tuna Court does far more than simply resolve disputes.
FOUlih, by comparing conflict over auctioned tuna in the United States
and Japan, the Article highlights the superficiality of generalizations about
American litigiousness and Japanese aversion to conflict, as \vell as other
myths about transcendent differences between the two legal systems. 19
American tuna traders rarely complain about the quality of their purchases,
and U.S. tuna auctions do not provide a formal mechanism for resolving
disputes. Japanese buyers, in contrast, fOl1nally dispute the price of almost
2% of all auctioned tuna, and there is a formal mechanism to adjudicate
their claims. To explain that contrast, the Article uses an analytic middle
ground between hard-nosed economism and rootless culturalism. 20 It
18. Standard legal trcatises on auctions--of which {here arc few-dc:vote little attention to
conflicts over quality. since the fonnal legal systcm treats disputes over thc' quality of auctioned goods
as a subset of cases that involve the law of salcs and merchantability. See. for example, BRtAi' W.
HARVEY AND FRA"KLlt' MEISEL. AI]CIIONS LAW AND PRACTICE 168-70 (2d cd. 1995), which spends
only a page and a half discussing such conflicts. See olso SAMUEL LIVERMORE. TREATISE ON THE L..,. W.
RELATI VE TO PRJ:--let P.'" I.S. Acc'Ts. FACTORS. AUCTIO"i EERS. AN D BROK ERS ( 181 I); Kuli R. Bachman.
Wailing/or Ihe Hamiller In Foll:.4 Gelleral O\'eITieH' olAlicrion Lo\\' (2002) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author). In contrast to the sparse legal literature on auctions is the volulllinous economic
literature. including PAUl. KLI'MPERFR. AUCTIONS: THEORY A"'D PRACTICE (2004): R. Preston McAfee
& John McMillan. AIiCliol1\ alld Biddillf!-. 25 J. Ecot'. Ln. 699 (1987); Paul Milgrom, AUCliolls olld
Bidding' A Primer. 3 J. [COi'. PERSP. 3 (1989); Paul R. Milgrom and Robeli J. Weber. A Theon' or
Allelions and COl11pelill\'(' Bidding. 50 ECOM)METRICA 1089 (1982): William Vickrey.
COlllllerspeculolion..-1l/clions. and Compelili\'e Sealed Tenders. 16 J. fir-.:. R (1961).
19. Generalizations about "the Jaranese" continue \0 plague the lay literature. despite a largc
volume of publications that successfully attack such essentializing claims. See. e.g.. PETER '. DALE.
THE MYTH OF JAPANESF UNIQUE"ESS (1986); SHEl.DON GARON. MOI.I)INC; JAPAi"FSE MINDS: THF
STATE IN EVERYDAY LiFE (1997): STF.\TN R. REFD. MAKING COM 10N SENSE OF J",P.·\"i (199).
20. As anthropologisi Theodore I:kstor argues in his recent cthnography of Tsuki.li. "[a]uctions in
the real world are inseparable from thc social institutions and cultural meanings that frame them.
Auclions have many characteristics and outcomes. only one of which is to sell products compctitively
to the highest bidder." 131.S!< IR. SI/pra note 9. at 18 J. Smith makes a similar point:
\Vhen people paniclpate in auclions they act not only 3S individuals intent on pursulllg
individual sclf-illlerests but. consciously or unconsciously. as P3rt of a comllllillily. Thesc
aUL'lion commuuitics h3\'e their own goals. the most important of which is achicving a
consensus regarding the values and allocation of the goods bought 3nd sold. The pursuit of
this goal reqUIres thc' production and reproduction of these very samc communities. That is.
the processes of dClermining the price and allocating: objects arc linked to other processes that
serve to deline and maintain Ihe communities within which theSe" rroee,ses occur. .1\s
mllst auctions require a communitv of some son for their very existence. Sll the auctinn
commonly ser:cs as a means for maintaining such communities.
Charles \\' Smith . .I\ uctions: The Soci31 Construction nr Value 5 J (19X9)
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accepts the view that Americans and Japanese will both articulate and pur-
sue grievances when it is in their interest to do SO.21 But it treats such inter-
ests as highly contextual, depending upon individual and social values, the
availability of particular dispute-resolution mechanisms, and the existence
and power of financial incentives, among other factors. The Article em-
ploys carefully tailored analysis rather than broad generalization to unravel
the different approaches to tuna defects in the United States and Japan.
Fifth, the success of the Tuna Court indicates that thoughtfully de-
signed and focused courts may outperform the infonual norms of close-knit
commercial groups. California cattle ranchers, New York diamond dealers,
and Tokyo tuna traders all had the option to use formal legal procedures to
resolve their disputes, but only the tuna traders invoked law rather than
norms to settle their differences. A greater number and variety of case stud-
ies is needed to better understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of
infoIl11al norms and specialized courts and to identify the contexts in which
each is likely to succeed. Based upon a comparison of the three cases,
however, it appears that one crucial detenninant of the choice between law
and nonus is the design of legal institutions. Formal legal processes that
meet the needs of parties will succeed, whereas those that are time-
consuming, expensive, cumbersome, and stigmatizing (as appears to have
been the case in Shasta County) will lead parties to rely on nonns rather
than law.
Part I of this Article describes the key parties involved in the buying
and selling of tuna at the Tokyo Central Wholesale Market (Tsukiji) and
the operation of the tuna auction in the market. Part II provides a history of
Tsukiji and a discussion of the evolution of its tuna auction; it uses the
scant historical record to speculate on the origin of the Tuna Court. Part III
looks in detail at the operation of the Tuna Court. Data on the number,
resolution, and appeal of claims shows that it is an extremely busy place,
processing approximately twenty-five cases every day and close to seven
thousand per year. 22 Part IV provides a comparative view by examining
how disputes similar to those at Tsukij i are resolved in the biggest tuna
auction in the United States.
In Part V, the Article returns to the law and nonns literature and its
focus on conflict resolution among members of close-knit commercial
groups. It reviews the dominant claims of scholars of law and economics
and law and society, particularly the view that close-knit commercial trans-
actors will develop extrajudicial, infonnal approaches to disputing because
21. J. Mark Ramseyer has convincingly made this point in a series of influential books and
articles. See. e.g.. J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato. The Rational Litigant: Selliement Amounts
ulld ('aclict Rutes in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263. 2l)() (1989).
.,.., The market operates approximately 2RO days per year; it is closed on Sundays. some
'vVednesdays. national holidays. and for 5 days from December 31 through January 4.
Tsukiji Market at 4:30 a.m.: The Start of the Tuna .Auction
Pre-auction Inspection of Fresh Tuna
Tsukiji's Tuna Auctioneers
Nakaoroshi Bidding for Tuna
Taking Possession and Sectioning Purchased Tuna
Aerial View of the Tuna Court
Complainants and .Judges at the Tuna Court
Announcing Verdicts and Closing Shop
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they are more efficient than formal legal rules. In contrast, the Article ar-
gues that although Tsukiji's tuna traders rely on a fonnal, state-centered
dispute resolution system, this system efficiently meets the needs of the
parties. Part VI more fully explains the success of the Tuna Court. It argues
that Tsukiji's tuna dealers have embraced a method of managing conflict
that not only succeeds in efficiently resolving conflict but also serves to
facilitate the maintenance of order in the marketplace. The process of
bringing claims to the Tuna Court fosters rather than damages relation-
ships, thereby supporting a marketplace where thousands of tuna are
quickly exchanged23 and enhancing, rather than destroying, community.24
By providing a venue that helps parties refine their expertise, balances the
power of market players, and promotes a shared sense of fairness, the Tuna
Court transfonns potentially divisive conflict into the glue that binds tuna
traders and creates a stable environment for Tsukiji's tuna auction.
I
AUCTIONING TUNA AT THE TOKYO CENTRAL WHOLESALE MARKET
The chain of events that leads to a claim about the quality of auc-
tioned tuna starts in the early morning, when trucks filled with fish unload
at the Tsukiji marketplace. Although it is located in central Tokyo just
steps from the upscale Ginza district, Tsukiji is built on the water's edge.
In the past, boats plying the Pacific entered Tokyo Bay and moored on the
market's docks.
These days, almost all tuna that reaches the auction floor is flown to
Tokyo and driven from the airport to the market. 25 Most of the tuna comes
to Japan from overseas-some are farmed in Mexico; others are shipped
from suppliers in Indonesia .. Sri Lanka, and Taiwan; still others are initially
caught in fishing boats off the coast of Spain and elsewhere. 26 Most of it
arrives frozen, since tuna boats often remain on the water for extended pe-
riods and have flash-freezing facilities on board. Some arrive fresh, packed
on ice and shipped in large boxes called coffins. Only a small portion of
the tuna at Tsukiji comes from Japanese suppliers, but it includes the most
highly prized eatch-bluefin tuna from Japan's northern coast, many
weighing over 500 pounds and arriving at Tsukiji by truck. As shown in
23. For a sophisticated economic analysis of transaction costs. see OUVER E. WIlLlAMSO):. TIiE
ECOl\OMIl" INSTITln JO~S or C\I'ITAl.ISM FI RMS. MARKETS. RELATIONAL CONTRACIIN(j ( I l)R5 J.
24. For a study or the community-building function of auctions from a sociological perspective.
see Phyllis Harrison-Brose. Community. Business and Play: The Country Sale as Symbolic Interaction
(Aug. 19 '3) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Indiana University) (on file with author).
25. Tuna that alTive at Narita Ail11Lll1 near Tokyo are subject to an import duty of 35".,: they arc
taken through customs within two or three hours oran'ival and brought directly to Tsukiji.
26. For a list of the main exporters of tuna to Japan. including the volume and type of lUna
exported, see hup:!/www.globefish.org (last visited Mareh 2006). Seventy percent of Tsukiji's tuna is
imp0l1ed. and it Cl1mes from over sevenly different countries. Illlerview with Officials from the (JIIIOIIIJ
Gni/,ui. in TsuklJi Markel. Japan (Dec 2.2(04).
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Figures I and 2, there is a relatively constant supply of frozen tuna
throughout the year, and its price is stable. The supply of fresh tuna, on the
other hand, is highly seasonal, and price varies accordingly. Both fresh and
frozen tuna are susceptible to the same sorts of problems that lead to dis-
putes over quality, and both are regularly brought to the Tuna Court. In
fact, despite the higher price of fresh tuna and the correspondingly higher
stakes of disputes over its quality, it appears that fresh and frozen tuna are
brought to the Court at a rate proportional to their sales volume. This sug-
gests that money alone may not explain the utilization of the Tuna Court, a
theme this Article's final part discusses.
FIGURE 1
Volume and Average Price of Frozen Tuna, 2003
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Data provided by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Marine and Agricultural Products Division
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FIGURE 2
Volume and Average Price of Fresh Tuna, 2003
--_.---' ¥O







































Data provided by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Marine and Agricultural Products Division
(sliisU11110S011 hinka).
Because of the size and structure of the Japanese tuna market and the
internationalization of tuna fishing, auctioning tuna at Tsukiji involves a
variety of parties. The market is owned and operated by the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government (TMG), and city officials are involved in every
aspect of the auction, from the an'ival of fish at the marketplace to their
display, sale, processing, resale, and shipping.!7 Fish suppliers are also es-
sential to the operation of Tsukiji. Although they are not a physical pres-
ence in the marketplace, they own and operate fishing vessels worldwide
and send their catch to the market. Because few of the suppliers are based
in Tokyo, they entrust their products to oroshi, or sellers/
brokers/wholesalers, who are responsible for getting the tuna onto the auc-
tion floor and for operating the auction. Oroshi rarely own the tuna that
they sell. Instead, they profit by taking a commission on whatever they
auction, at a TMG-mandated rate of 5.5% of the sales price.!l( Five oroshi
companies are authorized by the TMG to auction tuna (as well as other
products) at Tsukiji-Chuo Gyorui (known as Marunaka), Daito Gyorui,
27. \1any aspects of the market are subject to the control of the Ministry of Agriculture. Forcstry.
and Fisheries (MAFF), but it is the TMG. not MAFI':' that is a hands-on presence in thc markctplace
n. Tsukiji's uroshi pay their suppliers according to the following gcneral fonnula: gross sales
arc dctermined by multiplying the net auction sales priCe by 5% (sales tax); from that figure, they
subtract a 5)'% commission. a 3.5%, Import duty, a customs clearancc fee, the cost of trucking the tUlla
from the airport to the market. and whatever the bank charge, to rcmit payment. Oroshi are supposed III
pay their suppliers within five days nf an auction. See http:',ww\\·.daiichisuisan.l'o.Jpl (last visited \1ar
2(06)
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Toto Suisan, Tsukiji Uoichiba, and Daiichi Suisan. In terms of the quantity
and value of annual tuna sales, there are significant differences in size, with
Chua (the biggest) being approximately three times larger than Daiichi (the
smallest), and not surprisingly they compete with each other for market
share. 29 The auction floor is divided into five sections, and the oroshi con-
duct their auctions simultaneously, with auctioneers working hard to attract
bidders through their sales techniques. Buyers, the final parties essential to
the auction, must also be authorized by the TMG, and authorization is gen-
erally limited to those who own the rights to maintain a wholesale stall in
the Tsukiji marketplace. Known as nakaoroshi or intermediate wholesalers,
buyers (as I will call them in this Article) at Tsukiji purchase tuna at the
auction and resell it to sushi chefs, local fish markets, and other purveyors
who come to the market every morning for their daily supplies.
The buying and selling of stall rights within Tsukiji is reminiscent of
the market for taxi medallions in New York City, with large fluctuations in
value depending upon the general state of the economy and the specific
conditions of the fishing industry.3D Each stall owner receives a special
plastic badge from the TMG, which they must pin on their cap so that auc-
tioneers can recognize them as legitimate bidders. There are approximately
300 specialized tuna dealers at Tsukiji. 31 In addition, 72 additional badges
have been given to companies that do not have stalls at Tsukiji but that the
TMG considers to have the requisite tuna expertise to take part in the auc-
tion. 32 Because a number of Tsukiji-based buyers own the rights to more
than one stall and receive a separate badge for each, some companies au-
thorized to buy tuna may be represented by multiple bidders at the daily
auction.
Prior to the auction, generally at 3 a.m., sellers (l will refer to the five
oroshi companies and their employees as sellers, auctioneers, and oroshi)
arrange their daily "catch" on the cement floor of the auction house. The
29. Daiichi has 144 employees and had annual sales in both 2002 and 2003 of over $400 million
per year (¥47.6 billion in 2002. ¥46.7 billion in 2003). See supra note 28. In contrast, Chua Gyomi.
with more than 250 employees, had gross sales of well over $1 billion dollars (¥156.1 billion) in 2002.
See http://www.manmaka-net.co.jp/indcx.htm (last visited Mar. 2006).
30. See BESTOR, supra note 9. at 226-3\, for a detailed discussion of Tsukiji's stall licenses. For
an analysis of the taxi medallion system in New York, see NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB FACT BOOK 2004,
as well as other papers and data. availahle al htrp://www.schallerconsult.com/taxi/ (last visited March
2006)
31. The Tsukiji marketplace has \648 stalls for nakaoroshi, or intennediate wholesalers, bur the
stalls are quite small, so most nakaoroshi rent two or more stalls. The biggest nakaoroshi may occupy
as many as ten stalls. In tota!. 837 different nakaoroshi operate in the market. Information from the
Tsukiji office of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (on file with author).
32. Outside dealers allowed to participate in the tuna auction include the operators of
supermarkets, companies that own chains of sushi restaurants (particularly kailen zushi, which are
inexpensive shops where customers sit on stools arranged around a moving conveyor belt, select their
desired sushi, and are charged on a per-piece basis), and others. Article 60 of the TMG Ordinance
allows goods to be sold only to authorized buyers.
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tuna have their bellies gutted, tails cut, major fins removed, and are some-
times displayed with their heads removed. The presentation of the tuna is
far from haphazard. Auctioneers need to create a flow and rhythm to the
auction, and they group their fish according to whether they are fresh or
frozen, and sort them according to size and what they believe to be their
overall quality. Once the fish are ananged, generally an hour or two before
the start of the 5:30 a.m. auction (5:00 a.m. during the busy end-of-year
period), buyers anive and inspect them. Inspection is specifically author-
ized by the TMG's ordinance, and it is crucial to buyers because it allows
them to evaluate the quality of the tuna and decide which fish they want to
buy.33 Buyers rely on a number of factors to detennine their bids. The most
obvious are whether the fish is fresh or frozen (fresh are generally more
prized), whether it is fanned or wild (wild is preferred), and the species,
with bluefin (kuromaguro, honmaguro, minami maguro) the largest and
most expensive, bigeye (mebachi) the most common, and yellowfin (ki-
hada) , bonito (katsuo), and others evaluated according to season, size, and
condition.
Identifying most of these factors requires no special knowledge, since
each fish is labeled with its country of origin and the name of the supplier
(which makes clear whether it \vas farmed), and after a few weeks of con-
tact with a large volume of tuna even a novice can differentiate species.
What does require expertise is the evaluation of a particular tuna's charac-
teristics, most importantly its color, oil content, texture, and taste. As buy-
ers walk the auction floor, they cany flashlights, gaffs, and towels.3~ When
they stop for a close look at a tuna they shine the flashlight inside the body
cavity, tap its side with the gaff to check for density (like watermelon,
every tuna will produce a different type of thud), examine the tail cut for
signs of marbling (a fatty tuna is a tasty tuna), check for indications of
bruising that may result from a difficult catch or mistreatment, look for
disease by examining the color and texture of the flesh, rub a small amount
of meat between their fingers to feel the oil content, and smell or even taste
some of the meat. 35 Both fresh and frozen tuna undergo a similar inspec-
tion, although there are a few procedures, like pulling open a tuna belly
with a gaff, that arc possible only \vith fresh fish.
33. Article 70 of the TMG Ordinance authorizes inspeclion.
34. /\ gaff has a long wooden handle IhJI terminates in a sharp. curved piece of metal and looks
slrikingly like the am) of Disney's Captain Hook.
35. There arc some differences in how huyers at different tuna auclions inspecI the goods. In
Hawaii. for examplc, lhere is a tradilion of "digging:' which means that buyers will push their tingers
or entire hand into the luna where the tail has been cuI and rip out some flesh. which lhey \\·ill then look
at, smell. and rub. As a result. a part of the tuna is ruined, and there are small chunks of meat covering
the fish and the floor. The operators of the Hawaii tuna auction have considered prohibning "digging.'·
but they are concemed that it is such a deeply engrallled tradition among buyers that there \\·ould be
strong resistance. Inlel\·le,,· with Management of United Fishing Agency. in Honolulu. \-law. (Feb.
20(5) (on file with aUlhor).
326 CALIFORNIA LAW REI//t.·W lVol. 94:313
Because both buyers and sellers at Tsukiji are extremely knowledge-
able about tuna, their ability to detect even minor and subtle differences
between fish is finely tuned. In fact, interviews with tuna experts in the
United States make clear that Japanese tuna buyers arc accorded the high-
est degree of respect. When asked about the Japanese buyers who .some-
times show up at his market, for example, a Boston dealer replied that "us
guys in Boston know how to make a paycheck at the end of the week, but
those guys [the Japanese buyers] know fish."36 Likewise, the managers of
the largest U.S. tuna auction, located in Honolulu, have confidence that the
Amerlcan buyers who frequent their auction are highly knowledgeable and
can easily distinguish between the tuna grades that are used to demarcate
good from very good or excellentfish. 37 But when it comes to making the
finest distinctions, they have much more faith in Japanese buyers. "Our
guys know the difference between good and very good fish," they state.
"But when it comes to the difference between a tuna that is worth $11.00 a
pound and another that might be worth $11.50? They [Japanese buyers]
definitely have the edge."
Armed with their expert knowledge of tuna and the specific infonna-
tion derived from inspection of the fish displayed on the auction-house
f1oor, buyers respond to the 5:30 a.m. bell that signals the start of the daily
auction. 3~ They congregate in one of the five areas where the auction com-
panies begin to hawk their wares. Auctioneers stand on small platforms so
that they can easily see all bidders, and their first duty is to call out the
number of the fish that is being offered for sale (every tuna is numbered).
Each auctioneer has a distinctive style; some are relatively calm and direct,
whereas others sway, swing their arms, and turn every transaction into a
melodic chant.
Tsukiji's tuna auction uses a distinctive simultaneous bidding system
that has been labeled the "Japanese auction" system. N When the auction
36. Telephone Interview with Scan Bergen. Globe Fish Company, in 80ston. Mass. (Feb. 2005)
(on file with author).
37. See. e.g, Seafood Auction Company Grading Sytem. (Apr. I. 2004),
http://www.bidforfish.eom. which describes a common way of grading tuna. Not surprisingly, A+ is the
highest grade, which indicatc:s a '"fat fish, thick with pink belly walls and red veins; finn with
silver/black exterior. solid nape. still bleeding, Excellent freshness. Bloodline is bright, red and thin,"
followed by A ("Similar in all ways as A+, but possibly lacking in one quality Ex: firm but not as firm
as an A+ fish. Red veins in belly cavity; thin red bloodline; excellent freshness.") and A- ("Still a near
perfect fish with silver/black exterior, excellent belly cavity perfectly intact and bright. Bloodline is
red, but may be wider or dark<:r than A grade."). These descriptions should make clear that the
distinctions between tuna that are A+ and A- are difficult to put into words. even though they are
distinctions that make a eonert:lc difference when it comes to auction and retail price.
3R. Many auctions start similarly; in the early days of the tobacco auction. for example, a bugle
was blown to signal the beginning of the auction.
39. RALPH CASSADY. JR. AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 64 (1967). There are many different
auction styles, with the most common being the English (ascending price) and Dutch (descending
price). Fish auctions also empluy different types of auctions. At the Honolulu Fish Exchange, for
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begins and the auctioneer calls out the number of the product being sold,
bidders simultaneously raise their hands and use a signal (teyari) recogniz-
able only to those "in the know" to indicate the price they are willing to
pay.40 As a result, two or more bidders will often make the same bid. As
bids are made, bidders remain silent and make an effort to look disinter-
ested, as the auctioneer quickly scans the raised anns to identify the highest
bid(s).41 When he identifies the best offer, the auctioneer will call out the
price, and bidders can then use hand signals to make a higher bid. When
the auctioneer calls out the highest bid price three times and there are no
higher bids, the fish is sold.
Depending upon how high the bidding goes, the number of bidders,
and the supply of fish, an auctioneer may award a tuna to a bidder and
move on to the next item without working telTibly hard to increase the bid
amount. The volume of tuna sold at the market each moming makes it im-
perative to keep the auction moving briskly.42 In 2004, as indicated in
Figure 3, there were between 55,000 and 75,000 tuna auctioned each
month, or almost 3000 tuna every day.43
example, a modilied 1'01111 of the Dutch auction is uscd. with Ihe auctiL)neer staning at a high price and
then dropping it ulllil a buyer places the first hid. The auctioneer then nl!ls out a higher price with the
hope of getting other huvers to stan hidding. For a dcseription or the Japanese auction. set: S~IJTH.
supra note 20.
40. See BES10!C supra note 9. at 191 for a diagram ofTsukiji hand bidding signals.
41. Cassady notes that "'more so perhaps than either the English L)j" the Dutch auction. [Ihe
Japanese auction] is characterized b\ a great deal of noise and confusion. Illueh of it steillming li'omthe
effons of scores of hidders to gain tht: attention of the auctioneer ,. c.\ss.·\J)Y. supm note 39. at 64. 1\1\
experience. in cOlllras!. is that aside from the chants of the aUClioneers. the TsukiJi tuna auction IS
surprisingly quiet and extranrdinarilv orderly. Perhaps things ha\'c changed since Cassad\'s resean'h
four decades ago: his description of the now concrete-and-steel auction hall as "'made of roughhewn
timber" makes clear that at least some aspects of the marketplace have clwnged.
42. .As Cassady notes. "speed is essential in the sale of lIsh'" C\SSAJ)), S/lfJl"U note 39. at b6
43 This is ;] rough calculation. assuming an 3\'cr3ge or 65.U{JO luna sold each month and 2X()
market days per Yl'ar. which equals an 3\erage of 2. 7Ril tuna per Jay.
32~
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Because the auction often takes only an hour and rarely lasts longer
than two hours (auctioneers can sell approximately 400 individual fish in
an hour), it is essential that buyers start the bidding at a reasonable price
and sellers move on to the next tuna as soon as they have received an offer
they think is close to the highest possible price. Taking another five or ten
seconds to coax a few more yen out of buyers is not considered a prudent
usc of time. It is more important to maintain a rapid pace, since buyers
need to take possession of their fish and get to work at their market stalls
before retail customers begin their morning shopping.
One important consequence of the type of auctioning and bidding em-
ployed at Tsukiji is that it gives auctioneers a great deal of discretion over
the buyer to whom they will award a given tuna. An auctioneer is often
faced with a number of bidders offering an identical price, and the result is
that he has considerable leeway. He may favor a particular buyer who he is
trying to win over as a regular client. He may distribute the fish equitably
by making sure to accept bids from different buyers at roughly the same
rate. Or he may punish particular bidders by ignoring their teyari. This last
alternative underscores the importance of the relationship between buyers
and sellers. Although the core element of that relationship is the economic
transaction at the auction in which they agree on a price and exchange a
good, there is more to their connection than a discrete economic bargain
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that takes the form of a bidding competition between buyers and the sale of
a good to the highest bidder. Sellers must create an environment that al-
lows buyers to feel like they will be treated fairly, and buyers must act in
such a way as to not jeopardize their chances of being able to purchase
fish. It is a delicate balance of power.
II
ORIGINS: THE EVOLUTION OF TSUKIJI'S TUNA COURT
As with many embedded social institutions, it is difficult to unearth
the precise origin of Tsukiji's Tuna Court. The historical and cultural im-
portance of seafood in Japan may tempt one to think of the Court as a fea-
ture of the Japanese fish trade that has been around for centuries. In fact, it
appears to be of relatively recent vintage. Although fish merchants have
long plied their wares in the area now known as Tokyo (called Edo until
1868), it was not until the early seventeenth century that a central fish mar-
ket emerged. It was located in an area called Nihonbashi, close to the
Tokugawa Shogun's Edo Castle in the heart of Tokyo. From its inception,
dealers at the market (who initially sold fish they caught from their own
boats but later purchased fish for resale) were regulated by the shogunate:
they were permitted to operate their businesses and were granted certain
tax exemptions, but they had to supply the castle with fish. 44 By the end of
the nineteenth century, Tokyo's rapidly growing population made the loca-
tion of the fish market an impediment to urban development, and tensions
between fishennan, fish wholesalers, and the government escalated.4~ Soon
after Japan was roiled by the 1918 Rice Riots, in 1923 the N ihonbashi
market was destroyed by a massive earthquake and fire. A new era in the
Japanese fish trade was about to begin.46
In ] 923, the national government enacted the Central Wholesale
Market Law. 47 Among its most fundamental goals was the reconfiguration
of trading relationships that had resulted in the increasing power of urban
fish wholesalers and the exploitation of individual fishennen and small
fishing communities. In addition to making kohei (equity, impartiality) and
kosei (fairness, justice) the guiding principles of the wholesale market sys-
tem, the law also changed the mechanism through which fish were bought
and sold. For the first time, auctions were made the primary mechanism for
44. See BI.s lOR. supra note 9. at 97-125. for an inforl11ative discussion of the history of Tokyo'"
j~sh markets. /\ good overview is also available at http://www.tsukiji-markc!.or.jp.yollk.\SlJ·
konjyakworiginhll11 (last visikd 'vlar. 200h)
4S Cassadv describes the prewar period as onc ill which distributors with marketing 111011\)jlO!ll'"
gralllcd by feudal leadcrs v.;ere able to exploit local. small-scale fishcIlllcn. and for that pri\i1cge the\
paid tribute to the shogunate. C"SSAIlY. supra note .ill. at .iX.
40 BES\f)K. supro note 9. at I 12-1.i.
·P. ChOo Oroshillri Shijo Ho.
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the exchange of fish. p; Construction of a new Tsukiji marketplace was
completed in 1935, but not until 1955, after the post-war LJ .S. Occupation
of Japan, did Tsukiji begin its current tenure as a non-military-controlled
fish market.-il]
Although tuna were auctioned for a few years in the mid-1930s, there
is no evidence that the Tuna Court existed during that time. It is of course
possible that prewar buyers who purchased damaged tuna at auction sought
relief from sellers, and that buyers and sellers either collectively or indi-
vidually crafted a system to manage quality problems. But that is only
speculation; there are no written histories or other documents that so much
as mention disputes over the quality of auctioned tuna during the prewar
period. Indeed, the first evidence of a system for resolving disputes over
the quality of tuna involves the Osaka Central WholesaJe Market, not
Tsukiji. Given Osaka's history as a center of trade and commerce, that is
not surprising. 50 The first central fish market in Osaka dates from the build-
ing of Osaka Castle in 1583. Pursuant to the 1923 Central Wholesale
Market Law, in 1931 the Osaka Municipal Central Wholesale Market was
inaugurated, and after a temporary closure during World War II it was re-
opened in 1950, five years before normal operations were resumed at
Tsukiji. 51
Exactly when the Tuna Court began to operate at Tsukij i is unclear.
Although there are no written histories of the market that mention the reso-
lution of conflicts over the quality of tuna, evidence from Osaka indicates
that the inauguration of the auction system quickly led to a variety of unan-
ticipated problems. Of particular concern was the willingness of some sell-
ers to reduce the price of auctioned goods for certain favored buyers with
market power."2 Post-auction price reductions threatened the success of the
48. Prior to auctions, sales of IIsh \\icre accomplishcd through negotiated prices. Auctions for
vegetables were common earlier. Sl!e http:/:www.lsukiji-market.orjp/youkoso/konjyaku/origin.htm
(last visited Mar. 2006). Auctions are detined by Paragraph 7, AI1icie 2, of the TMG Ordinance, and
authorized by Paragraph I of Article 47.
49. BESTOR, supra note 9, at 115-17. For a recent discussion of the Japanese tuna industry, with a
particular focus on the interaction of U.S. and Japanese policies regarding the management of fishing
resources, see Harry N. Scheiber, C·.S Policy, Ihe Pacific Tww Economy. and Ocean [CI\\'
Innovation: The Post-World ~Var!J Em. 1945101970, in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 29-
53 (David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber e:ds .. 2004).
SO. Seventy percent of Japan's wealth V\ias concentrated in Osaka at th.:: end of the nineteenth
century; this made it the nation's trade: ceillcr. ORIGINS OF THE MODERN JAPANESE S rATE: SELECTED
WRITINGS or: E.H. NORMAN 156. 164 (1ohn W Dower ed .. 1975). Osaka was also the site of the first
futures market. Ie!.; see Ulrike Schae:de, The Development of Organized F'lItures Trading: The Osaka
Rice Bil! Market of 1730, in lAPA ESE Fli':Ai'C1.AL M.'\RKET RESEARCH, 339-66 (William T. Ziemba et
al. cds., 1991); see also Mark D. West. Privale Ordering al the World's Firsl FUlures Exchange, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000).
51. http://www.shijou.city.osaka.jri ("lSt visited :vIar. 2006).
52. Chuo Groshillri Shij6-·-0sakashi ChilO Oroshiuri Shiji5 no Rekishi 10 Kiiz6 [Cenlral
Wholesale /vlarker--HisroIT and Sll"lIcillre of lite Osaka Citv Wholesale lvlarke/!, 159 (M iyamoto
Mataji and Sakudo Y6taro eds .. Osaka. ("hUI! KlIrohll 19(4).
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auction system, and market administrations and traders agreed to prohibit
such practices in July 1950. But they made one exception by permitting
reductions that could be justified by the compromised quality of auctioned
products.5.' To evaluate the legitimacy of price reductions, they established
the Jiko Shori~;)li5, or Accident Management Place, where a city official
would record the facts of a transaction, a representative from the broker
selling the allegedly damaged fish would act as a chief judge (shushin), and
representatives from other wholesalers would serve as assistant judges (fu-
kushin) in detennining whether a price reduction was walTanted. 54
Interviews at Tsukiji indicate that tuna traders there began to experi-
ment with ways of managing quality problems soon after the 1955 reopen-
ing of the market, when the use of auctions to sell tuna became the nonn. 55
Without a regularized system for resolving conflict, buyers who ended up
with damaged tuna would sometimes request a discount from the seller. If
the seller was reluctant to offer compensation, which was often the case,
buyers would sometimes withhold (hor)'1:7) payment. Not only did that cre-
ate unwanted tension in an environment where buyers and sellers worked
together daily; it also put sellers in a difficult position, since they needed to
pay their suppliers. Both sellers and buyers were dissatisfied with this
stalemate, so together they went to the Tokyo city officials overseeing the
operation of Tsukiji and proposed that the management of conflict be sys-
tematized. 56 An experimental system was piloted in 1958, and again in
1960, first without supervision from city officials and gradually taking on
the characteristics of the CUlTent system. In ]972, the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government issued an ordinance outlining the operation of a dispute-
resolution mechanism. 57 For over three decades, the Tuna Court has oper-
ated, unchanged, within the Tsukiji marketplace.
53. Osaka-shi Sui san Kumiai, Osaka-shi Suisanbutsu Oroshi Kyodo Kumiai. SUiSCll1hulsu Rl'lll.\ii
no Henbii /() KlIIniai IIV Sanjyii-nen [TiJirll' Years vI' TrollS[imnarions and Associalions in Marine
ProdllCl J)islrihzilionJ 64 (Tokyo: Sojinsha. 1985).
54. See id.
55. UnfO!1Unately. finding an "old lllan of the market" with a long institutional lllemory is
difficult. because the taxing nature of work at Tsukiji makes it a job that is far friendlier to youth than
age. My speculations about the origin of Tsukiji's Tuna Coun come primarily from conversations with
:vir. : ozue Makoto. Director, OI/1IJno G"i5kai [Tuna and Swordfish Buyers AssociationJ, who kindly
took the time to talk with me about the history of the Tuna Coun. They are the most complete
observations of the origins of the Tuna Court that J was able to assemble and arc presented here as a
plausible but not definitive accounL
56. According to the Celllral Wholesale Market Law. wholesalers cannOT change the price of a
good after a bId is accepted at aucTIon. except in special circumstances. The Tuna ('ourt operatcs as one
of those special circumstances.
57. Mugul'O. ;':ajikirui 110 Jiko J\eI1SLI ri)I~\·6. June '2'2. 1972. 47 Chugyo Gyo Dai 100-Go. in
T()K y(). Tu CH uu OIWSHI URI S)-IIH') K"f'KI.J H()RFISH U ., I 5 ('2000). Local govelllmcnt regulations in
Japan are di\'ided inlo a number or categorics. depending upon. for example. whether they include
enforcement powers or penalties. The regulaTion that pertains to the Tuna Coun is called a yorvo.
which is a sl1ghly less robust form of gmernance than a ,iyorei because iT lacks clear or enforceable
sanctIons. I ha\'c translated both of them as "ordinance."
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III
BRINGING DISPUTES TO THE TUNA COURT
As buyers and sellers work their way through the day's supply of
tuna, the auction begins to wind down and activity shifts to the wholesale
stalls within the market. With extraordinary speed, thousands of tuna that
only an hour earlier densely lined the auction house floor are pulled
through the narrow aisles of the market on wooden carts and small, highly
maneuverable flatbeds, by which they are taken to the stalls of buyers.
Knives as long as skis, requiring two people to hold the blade, are used to
fillet the large fresh tuna, and industrial-strength band saws serve to cut the
frozen and extremely hard fish. Buyers are determined to quickly split open
their "catch" and slice it into sellable pieces because their customers will
soon arrive and they want to display their goods in the most attractive
manner possible. But they have an additional motivation for immediately
carving their catch: they want to look inside the fish to see whether it con-
fonTIs to their expectations of quality.
As discussed in Part I, Tuna buyers at Tsukiji can assess the quality of
tuna with an unusual degree of precision. They can look at a cross-section
of the tail and predict the fat content of the highly prized loro, or belly.
They can rub the exterior skin and have a clear idea of the texhlre of the
interior meat. But there are limits to what they can know beforehand about
certain potential problems with a tuna, because at Tsukiji tuna are auc-
tioned whole. 5R Until a whole tuna is sliced open, there is a risk that the
poking and prodding of the pre-auction inspection may have failed to re-
veal a defect that could diminish the value of even the most highly prized
and priced fish. So buyers quickly eviscerate their purchases, because if
there is a problem with internal quality they may want to complain. And
complaining means that they must bring their fish to the Tuna Court on the
same day that it was purchased59
58. Some have been gutted and have had their heads removed. See text accompanying supra note
33.
59. A brief methodological note is in order. Aside from a one-page discussion in Bcstor's book,
BESTOR, supra note 9, at 258, and the general description of the Osaka fish marker's dispute resolution
systcm mentioned below, I have found nothing in the Japanese or English-language literature about
conflicts over quality at Tsukiji. I have therefore relied primarily on two major sources of information
to learn about the Tuna Court. First. once the staffofthe TMG's Tsukiji office realized that I was going
to show up at the market every morning and keep asking for access to their data, they were good
natured enough to allow me to ~it in a comer of their office and look at their records. It is from those
records that I was able to collect the information contained in the figures below. In addition, the TMG
also provided me with the relevant data it had accumulated about market factors like the price of tuna.
volume of sales, and so forth. Second, from late November 2004 to early January 2005. I spent almost
every market morning watching the workings of the Tuna Court. Whenever possible, I would talk to the
judges and the buyers, taking whatever time was available during slow periods to ask que~tions. These
were far from structured interviews: the market is an extremely busy and fast-paced place, where
Benjamin Franklin's adage that '·time is money" is unusually apt. Rarely did any of my conversations
last for more than ten minutes, though I was able to speak with dozens of judges and buyers during my
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Since buyers can better judge the quality of a cut-up rather than a
whole tuna, thereby minimizing the risk that the fish they purchase will be
defective, one might assume that it would be in their interests to demand
that sellers auction only cut fish. In fact, there are tuna auctions in Japan
where this is the case. But that happens primarily at small, regional mar-
kets, where volume is small. In Tokyo, however, even the smallest
nakaoroshi can sell one or more whole tuna in a day.6D Moreover, although
buying and selling cut fish would decrease uncertainties about quality,
buyers and sellers both prefer to deal in whole fish. Not only would cutting
increase the time and trouble it takes sellers to get three thousand large
tuna each day to the auction floor, but cut fish are also more difficult for
sellers and buyers to handle. Because of the iron in tuna blood, its meat
changes color quickly when exposed to air, going from an appealing, rich
red to a brown, dark-chocolate color. In some countries, sellers spray the
meat with carbon monoxide to prevent discoloration (and to change the
color of an oxidized tuna from brown to red). In Japan, however, the use of
carbon monoxide is prohibited because it is seen as an inappropriate way of
masking possible problems. Moreover, cut tuna can be damaged if it comes
into contact with fresh water; the core temperature of a cut fish rapidly in-
creases, requiring constant refrigeration; and the risk of contamination in-
creases when the inside of a tuna is exposed. 61 For those and other reasons,
most buyers and sellers want to trade whole tuna, despite the risk of unrec-
ognizable defects at the auction. 62
Latent, intemal quality defects are not the only types of problems that
buyers encounter. After they take possession of a tuna, for example, buyers
weigh their purchase and may discover that a fish represented as 125 kilo-
grams weighs only J J0 kilograms" Occasionally, they discover that an ap-
parently clean, fresh fish was not iced well and has started to spoil. Once in
a while, they may find a problem that a careful inspection would have
mornings at the market. In addition. J interviewed officials of the Omol7o CHlkui [Tuna and Swordfish
Buyers Association] and whoever I found hanging around a room in the market that serves as a general
library anc! lounge lCillrinkaiJ.
60. ;-\0 data is available on the qual11ity or value of the daily purchases of buyers. But a casual
walk through the market makes clear that even the smallest stalls buy at least one whole fish each day.
and the larger stalls Illay buy a dozen or more
() I. Cutting tuna prior 10 auction may also lead to an incrcase in prices because it would decrease
risk: it could reduce the comparative ad\'amage of tuna c:-:pcl1isc by making clearly \"lsible sOllle of the
imemal f~lClnrs that only the most well-trained e:-:perts can judge before a luna is cut: it Illav require a
recalibratlon oj' the size of market stalls bccause buyers would need more refrigeration: and the emirc
markctplace might have to be cnclosed 10 create a more tempcrature-controlled environmcnt.
62. Thc prckrence of buyers and sellers for dealing in \\'holc tuna was reaffirmed by interviews
with tuna merchants in Hawaii. wherc the tuna auction is also limited 10 whole lish. Tclephone
Illlerview with Staff of United Fishing Agency and Fish Vv'hoksalc Companies (Feb. 20(5) (on file
with author). HISI (JR. SII/ira note 9. at 258. correctly points out that the whole-tuna rule disadvantages
buyers hceausc it limits their ability 10 fully evaluate quality. but hc underplays the degree to which
both hu~'crs and sellers benelit from the sale of whole fish.
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revealed but that they overlooked in the cold, dark, and rushed pre-auction
hours. On many occasions, the defect they discover would have eluded
even the most thorough and expert tuna bidder. In such cases, Tsukiji's
expert buyers have an opportunity for recourse. If after taking possession
of a tuna and opening it up they are dissatisfied with its quality and believe
they have overpaid, buyers can asseli a right to compensation. They do so
at an institution that is unique to Japanese fish markets and which finds its
most distincti ve expression at Tsukij i 's Tuna Court.63
From 7:30 to 7:45 every morning, and for three additional sessions
lasting fifteen minutes at 8: 15 a.m., 9: 15 a.m., and 10:30 a.m., the Tuna
Court convenes to adj udicate the claims of unhappy tuna buyers. Located
on a ban"en rectangle of outdoor cement adjacent to the tuna auction house,
the Court is clearly demarcated by a metal fence on two sides, a cinder-
block wall on one, and three plastic cones linked by a yellow pole that
serve as its entrance. On an A4-sized piece of paper taped to the wall is a
sign posted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) that officially
designates the area as the Jiko Kensa-sho, or Accident Inspection Place. A
small cardboard box attached to one wall contains f01111S for judges to fill
out when making their decisions, and in a comer is a pile of square pieces
of plywood that the judges can place on top of an I-beam and use as their
"bench" between cases.
The operation and jurisdiction of the Tuna Court is spelled out by a
TMG ordinance, passed in 1972 under authority delegated to the TMG by
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. fA It provides for the
resolution of conflicts over the quality of auctioned tuna, but it makes clear
that buyers cannot simply throw caution to the wind and recklessly bid for
poor-quality fish with the expectation that they will later be compensated.
Instead, it requires that sellers allow pre-auction inspection and makes
buyers responsible for whatever problems have been discovered through it.
The Court's focus, therefore, is on problems that arc akin to what one
might think of as no-fault complaints, since they involve a gap between a
buyer's expectations and the actual quality of a purchase resulting from
defects that even the most conscientious and highly skilled tuna expert
would not have discovered. The buyers who bring claims to the Tuna Court
will prevail only if they can show that the seller is at fault for a particular
problem (like misrepresenting the weight of a fish) or if the problem with
the quality of their tuna could not have been known without bringing it
back to their stall and opening it up.
63. Institutions similar to Tsukiji's Tuna Court appear to operate at othcr Japanese tuna auctions
where the fish are sold whole. like in Osaka, but the volume of tuna sold at Tsukiji dwarfs that of other
markets, and the Tuna Court is similarly more vibrant in Tokyo than elsewhere. Unfortunately, I have
no fOlmal comparative data; I spent weeks hanging around TsukiJi before gaining access to TMG's
records, and I did not have a similar opportunity elsewhere.
64. See supra note 5~.
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Although the Court has jurisdiction over different types of claims, the
vast majority involve no-fault complaints. Figures 4, 5, and 6. disaggregate
the complaints brought to the Tuna Court each month into four catego-
ries: no fault, spoilage, weight, and appeals.
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Complaints By Category, 2004*
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No-fault claims clearly make up the bulk of the Tuna Court's docket,
with other categories constituting an almost insignificant number of cases.
Most no-fault problems involve parasites (sashi), which are easily
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recognized once a tuna is filleted; in the early stages they look like small
grains of rice implanted in the meat, and later they become marble-sized or
golf ball-sized areas with an unattractive, gooey texture. Some tuna suffer
from a disease that tums part of the meat a hazy white color (yamai) and
changes its texture. Too much intemal blood is also a common no-fault
problem, and it causes large dark patches or thin dark veins to run through-
out the meat. Some no-fault problems make a tuna inedible, but more
commonly they decrease the value of a fish by altering its color and pres-
entation, factors critical to Japanese cuisine and thus to the price consumers
are willing to pay for a given cut of tuna.
Despite the fact that buyers and sellers at Tsukiji have high levels of
expertise, and despite the pre-auction inspection that enables buyers to
carefully calibrate their bidding, the rate of cases brought to the Tuna Court
would alan11 most product manufacturers. As figure 7 shows, in 2004 buy-
ers brought between fifteen and twenty disputes for every 1000 auctioned
tuna-a complaint frequency of 1.5% to 2%, or twenty-five to thirty com-
plaints each day .6~ Tuna sellers and TMG officials report that buyers are
more likely to complain when the volume of tuna sales is low, because
they have extra time and are particularly concel11ed with their profits in a
slow market. bh Yet as Figure 8 shows, tuna volume and claims volume
move roughly in unison. 67
65. From 1vlarch through "!ovember 2004. there was an a\'erage of twenty-seven eomp!aill1s per
day. Calculations based upon data provided by the Tsukiji office of the TMG.
66. Intervle\\s \\ith Oroshi, TMG Officials. in Tsukiji Market. Japan (Nov 2004-Jan.2(05)
67. The only lime when disputing increased in a slow market was between May and June. :\t all
other times. disputing increased when tuna volume increased (Aug.-Oct.). disputing decreased when
tuna volume decreased (/\pL-May. July-Aug.l, or disputing decreased when tuna volume increased
(MaL-Apr.. June-July. Oc\.- 0\'.). The latter rdationship suggCSls that a busv market mav cause a
decrease in disputing.. L'\ t'n though a slo\\' market does not lead to an upswing.
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To initiate a claim at the Tuna Court, buyers must attend an adjudica-
tion session on the same day as their purchase and bring at least one quarter
of the allegedly damaged fish, for which they must have paid at least ¥ 120
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per kilo.68 In most cases they bring the entire tuna. As they enter the
"place" where disputes are processed, they are met by a representative of
the TMG, to whom they provide a sales slip containing information about
the price, weight, and seller of their tuna, and from whom they receive a
sheet of paper with a case number. In addition to an official from the TMG,
who is required to supervise every meeting of the Court, there are five
judges charged with examining each tuna and determining the degree of
damage. Not surprisingly, judges are not members of the national judiciary,
nor do they have any legal training. Instead, they are registered tuna auc-
tioneers who work for the Tsukiji tuna brokers (oroshi) in the specialized
tuna and swordfish division. 69 To become auctioneers, they must take a
difficult series of TMG-administered exams, and to enhance their expertise
they attend various seminars on tuna offered by the Dmono Gyokai. Once
they believe that they have sufficient expertise and work experience, they
submit their credentials to the TMG for certification as judges. Each com-
pany supplies a judge for every adjudication session. 70 Like the staff of the
TMG, who are easily recognizable by their beige clothing and official caps,
oroshi (like the English-language word 'wholesaler,' oroshi can refer both
to the corporate entity and an employee of that entity) are clearly identifi-
able by their dark navy coats, all of which carry the corporate logo of the
employer.
As in any couIi, the flow of cases to the Tuna Court differs by day and
by session. 71 On some mornings only one or two buyers will attend the
7:30 a.m. session but ten or fifteen will show up at 8: 15 a.m .. On others,
the first session may be busy but the next sessions less so. More often than
not, the majority of claims are brought to the two middle sessions (8: 15
a.m. and 9:] 5 a.m.), and the early and late sessions are relatively quiet. The
flow of cases determines how long judges can deliberate about any specific
problem. But the time available for deliberation makes less of a difference
than one might imagine. Like buyers and perhaps more so, judges know
their tuna, and a quick glance is often all they need to evaluate the type and
severity of a problem. As they move from tuna to tuna, they may touch the
68. See supra note Sl\.
69. Although the ordinance allows buyers to serve as judges. it seems that the time commitment
makes this unattractive. and nl) buyers are currently involved in adjudicating cases.
70. The adjudicators supplied by the companies receive no speci;]) payment for their services. and
the companies are nol compensated by the T!V1(j or the buyers for the staff tlme that is devoted to the
resolution of disputes. That at kast in pan explains why no buyers have jumpcd at lhe chance tll be
judges. even though the TMC ordlilance permits them (o serve.
7). It appears that therl' arc ccnain buyers who are more likclv to bring fish to the Tuna Coun:
they are refeITed to by the samC' tCllll that one uses to dcscribe a cUSlllmer who is a "regubr" at a
restaurant (jv6rell). 11 is not clear whether "regulars" arc Just panicularly unlucky indiViduals when it
comes to buying tuna or if they arC' nltJre willing to lake lhe tinll' to disputC' their purchases. OnC'
possibility is that those who havc thcir market stalls in a section of the market that is close 10 the Tuna
Coun arc more likely to be regular~ than those who must traverse the' entire 1100r of the market 10 ge tll
Coul1
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interior meat, ask the buyer a question, and talk amongst themselves. There
is no formal hearing and buyers are not asked to explain the reason for their
claims. But they often try to draw the attention of the judges to what they
think is a particularly problematic part of the fish, and many argue their
cases by trying to convince the judges that the condition of their fish is
highly problematic. In some cases, judges spend only fifteen seconds
evaluating the condition of a tuna and deciding on what they think is a rea-
sonable resolution. In no case did I witness a judge spending more than
two minutes on a given case.
To enable the five judges to reach a verdict, they are given a fonn on
which to record their individual judgments. At each disputing session, one
judge serves as chairperson and collects the judgment fonns from the other
judges. By the terms of the TMG ordinance, the judges' options are lim-
ited. Buyers dissatisfied with a purchase cannot ask for the sale to be re-
scinded. Nor can they demand a price reduction equal to the total cost of
the damage. fnstead, the Tuna Court offers only one possible remedy: the
final price that was bid by the buyer and accepted by the seller can be ad-
justed by a percentage that reflects what the judges believe is the value of
fifty percent of the damage. Under the ordinance, the judges' scores are
averaged to determine the price adjustment. But in almost all cases the
chair looks at the five scores and guesses at a numerical average, rather
than computing the true average of the five scores. 72 For the price ofa tuna
to be reduced, the ordinance stipulates that the judges must assign it a per-
centage of at least II %; scores of 10% and under are insufficient for a
price reduction. fn addition to a floor of 11%, there is a 50% maximum
amount by which a bid price can be lowered. The I I% floor makes clear
that the Tuna Court will only respond to nontrivial damage and the 50%
maximum ensures that buyers and sellers will each suffer a loss equal to
half the value of the damage.
Once the chairperson has looked at the price-reduction scores of the
other judges and recorded the "average" score on a form supplied by the
TMG, he gets ready to announce the final verdict. Other judges gather
around him, the representative of the TMG stands by his side, and com-
plainants mingle on the periphery so they can hear the judgments. In a
voice that attests to his training as an auctioneer, the chair shouts out the
case number, name of the seller, and the percent of the price reduction. The
TMG official records the verdicts, and as he does so, he shouts the vital
information to ensure that there has been no miscommun ication. 73
72. In fact. judges have different approaches to detennining the average, with some dropping the
highest and lowest of the five scores and averaging the remaining three and others looking at all five
scores in determining the final price reduction.
73. Enforcement ofjudgments is relatively simple. The new. adjusted price is communicated by
the TMG to the buyer and seller. and in almost every case buyers pay. Ir they do nol, sellers can simply
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Most of the time, the shouting of the verdict is met with silence from
buyers, who take hold of their carts and rush back to their stalls.
Sometimes, a judge will pat the shoulder of a buyer and smile, or a buyer
will utter a casual remark to a seller, like "See you later" or "So it goes."
Rarely does a buyer look or act surprised when he hears the verdict, and for
good reason. Of the 5504 cases brought to the Tuna COUll from March
through November 2004 (see Figure 9), all but 208 of them received a re-
duction in price. 74 A significant plurality of the total, 2480 or about 45%,
led to an identical result-the minimum 11 % reduction in price. 75
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The next most common resolution was the maximum 50% price re-
duction, which was awarded in 638, or 11.6%, of cases. In Sl1011, almost
stop selling III the buyer until payment is made. and in extreme cases thc TMC can suspend the buyer's
bidding pri\'i1eges,
74, As Figure 9 indicatcs, price reductions clustcr in cenain amounts. whereas SlIme numb"rs arc
nevcr used, Sixty-fivc of the :;504 l'lJmplaints receivcd a 9~/() pnce rcduction, for example. but only"
rcceived 10%. and 103 got I gil Ii, But. none \\'<:rc awarded 17'% or 19%, When I asked the tuna traders
why some numbers werc so l'lJml1lon and others were so rare, they responded Ihat there arc somc
numbers thaI just sound unappealing in Japancse, and others that have a good "ring,"
75, Therc is no publich' available d:1Ia on the Tuna Coun, The forms on which verdicts arc
recordcd are collected on a fisc::Jl-year basis by the TMG, somc general figures arc tallied. and thcn tht'
detailed sheels arc thrown away, Thanb to the kindness of several officials in lhe Tsukl.li ofrice of the
TMG, J was given access to the dala being collected for 2004, Because the Japanese tiscal year runs
from April 1 to Vlarch 31. thl' onlv detailed data in the TMC; ortice staned III March 20U4,
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everyone who brings a complaint to the Tuna Court ends up paying less for
their tuna than they bid at the auction, and the majority of complainants-
57%-·receive either the lowest or the highest possible reduction. 76 These
results are important in understanding the role of contlict and its resolution
at Tsukiji, and [ will return to them in my conclusion.
Notably missing from the auction and the Tuna Court proceedings are
the actual tuna owners. Because of the internationalization of the tuna
trade, most owners have no physical or corporate presence in Japan. But
even fishing companies working within Japan do not attend. As a result,
the owners of the disputed tuna depend upon their agents--the oroshi
companies that provide the judges-to protect their interests. To some ex-
tent, the interests of the suppliers and the oroshi to whom they entrust their
catch are similar. Just as the owners profit more if their tuna are sold at the
highest possible price and disputes result in small reductions, so too does
the 5.5% commission of the oroshi increase with a higher price at auction
and decrease as auction prices fall and as the Court reduces prices. 77
In many cases, however, the difference in the commission is minimal,
and the potential for good will and increased future dealings created by
awarding a price reduction may outweigh the financial loss brought on by a
lower price. At the low end of the tuna price scale, for example, are
fam1ed, frozen bigeye tuna, which could sell for as little as $6.00 per kilo
and weigh only 60 kilos. An 11 % price reduction would cut the oroshi's
commission from $19.80 to $[7.60 and drop the sales price by only
$39.60; a 50% price reduction would decrease the sales price by $180.00
and cut the commission by $9.90. The five-judge panel, with representa-
tives from each oroshi company, prevents an individual judge from giving
more generous price reductions to those who regularly buy tuna from his
company, a strategy that might be used to lure buyers from their relation-
ships with other companies. Still, the willingness to be generous may ex-
tend only so far; there are bluefin tuna at Tsukiji that weigh over 250
kilograms and sell for upwards of $40 per kilo. When confronted with a
$10,000 fish, a 50% price reduction becomes far more than a low-cost way
of cementing relationships between buyers and sellers.n
76. One unusual finding from the 2004 data is that the number of claims brought during a week
remains relatively stable, with no discernable increase or decrease in the number of claims brought
early or latc in the week, aside from a drop-off on Saturday. Yet there appears to be a pattern in how
cases are resolved, with a steady rise in the generosity of price reductions from Tuesday through
Saturday; the reductions average 17.7% on Tuesday and climb to 18.8% on Saturday.
77. None ofTsukiji's oroshi so much as suggested that their commission should be based on the
original sales price, rather than be reduced in step with whatever price reduction is offered to buyers. [n
contrast, whenever I discussed the Tuna Court with American auctioneers, they assumed that
auctioneers' commissions would not be reduced, since the auctionecr had done his job by pairing a
buyer with a seller and should not be penalized by the existence ora defect in the product.
78. Technology provides owners with a certain degree of instant oversight. When a dispute
results in a substantial price reduction for an expensive fish, the Judge from the company that auctioned
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everyone who brings a complaint to tbe Tuna Court ends up paying less for
their tuna than they bid at the auction, and the majority of complainants--·
57%-receivc either the lowest or the highest possible reduction. 76 These
results are important in understanding the role of conflict and its resolution
at Tsukiji, and I will return to them in my conclusion.
Notably missing from the auction and the Tuna Court proceedings are
the actual tuna owners, Because of the internationalization of the tuna
trade, most owners have no physical or corporate presence in Japan, But
even fishing companies working within Japan do not attend. As a result,
the owners of the disputed tuna depend upon their agents-the orosh;
companies that provide the judges-to protect their interests. To some ex-
tent, the interests of the suppliers and the orosh; to whom they entrust their
catch are similar. Just as the owners profit more if their tuna are sold at the
highest possible price and disputes result in small reductions, so too does
the 5.YYo commission of the oroshi increase with a higher price at auction
and decrease as auction prices fall and as the Court reduces prices. 77
In many cases, however, the difference in the commission is minimal,
and the potential for good will and increased future dealings created by
awarding a price reduction may outweigh the financialloss brought on by a
lower price. At the low end of the tuna price scale, for example, are
farmed, frozen bigeye tuna, which could sell for as little as $6.00 per kilo
and weigh only 60 kilos. An 11 % price reduction would cut the orosh; 's
commission from $19.80 to $17,60 and drop the sales price by only
$39.60; a 50% price reduction would decrease the sales price by $180.00
and cut the commission by $9.90. The five-judge panel, with representa-
tives from each oroshi company, prevents an individual judge from giving
more generous price reductions to those who regularly buy tuna from his
company, a strategy that might be used to lure buyers from their relation-
ships with other companies. Still, the willingness to be generous may ex-
tend only so far; there are bluefin tuna at Tsukiji that weigh over 250
kilograms and sell for upwards of $40 per kilo. When confronted with a
$10,000 fish, a 50% price reduction becomes far more than a low-cost way
of cementing relationships between buyers and sellers. 78
76. One unusual finding from the 2004 data is that the number of claims brought during a week
remains relatively stable, with no discernable increase or decrease in the number of claims brought
early or late in the week, aside from a drop-off on Saturday. Yet there appears to be a pattern in how
cases are resolved, with a steady rise in the generosity of price reductions from Tuesday through
Saturday; the reductions average 17.7% on Tuesday and climb to 18.8% on Saturday.
77. None of Tsukiji's oroshi so much as suggested that their commission should be based on the
original sales price, rather than be reduced in step with whatever price reduction is offered to buyers. In
contrast, whenever 1 discussed the Tuna Court with American auctioneers, they assumed that
auctioneers' commissions would not be reduced, since the auctioneer had done his job by pairing a
buycr with a scller and should not be penalized by the existenec of a defect in the product.
78. Technology provides owners with a certain degree of instant oversight. When a dispute
results in a substantial price reduction for an expensive fish. the judge from the company that auctioned
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The high rate of claims suggests that buyers do not feel particularly
constrained about using the Court, but they do seem to worry about press-
ing their cases too far. Not only are buyers notably reticent to make com-
ments when the verdict is announced, they are also reluctant to appeal
(saishin), even though the TMG ordinance gives them a right to do SO.79
Appeals are supposed to be brought on the same day as the original judg-
ment but are sometimes made the following day. No new paperwork is
needed, nor are there special judges or a different venue. Buyers simply
return to the Tuna Court at one of the designated session hours and indicate
that they want a rehearing. As in the initial claim, they must bring their
damaged tuna, but they must also bring "new" evidence, which means the
tuna has to be cut in at least one more location to enable judges to have a
different view of the alleged problem. There is almost always some turn-
over of judges bet\veen court sessions (so that of the five judges at the 7:30
a.m. court session, for example, three may return at 8:] 5 a.m. and be joined
by two others). This provides continuity between the initial determination
and the appeal but also allows for a fresh perspective. Judges hearing an
appeal are informed of the original verdict, so they know if the appellant's
tuna received a score of 8% (and thus no price reduction was offered) or if
the first determination was to offer a 25% reduction, which the buyer be-
lieves was insufficient.
Although the announcement of the initial verdict is generally met with
silence, occasionally a buyer will emit a loud groan or rhetorically say,
"Are you kidding?" "What, only 15% for this kind of serious problem?" or
"Unbelievable." On rare occasions, perhaps once or twice a year, a buyer is
so dissatisfied with the initial determination and the resolution of the ap-
peal that he decides to press his case even further. The provisions of the
TMG ordinance are murky in terms of how they apply to such situations
because they do not distinguish between the first and subsequent appeals.
Nonetheless, when a case boils over and a buyer is deeply dissatisfied with
the actions of the Tuna Court, other parties get involved and help broker a
solution. Despite the infrequency of such problems and the absence of writ-
ten records, the comments of tuna traders suggest that in contentious cases
the judges, buyer, representatives from the Tuna and Swordfish Buyers
Association (Ol17ono Gyokai) , and sometimes another experienced and re-
spected tuna buyer will meet, examine the fish, and try to find a solution
that involves increasing the price reduction offered to the buyer by a mutu-
ally agreeable amount. xo
the lish ma\ USl' hi~ mobile phone to take a digital photo or the damage ,md instantly email the picture
(using the phone) tll the supplier.
79. Sec .\IIpr" note 57.
XO. Illtcr\'iL'\\'~ with T'vl(j Slarrand Judges. in Tsuklji \'larkL'1. J<.lpan (2005) (on tile With author).
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Perhaps the most notable aspect of the appeals process is how infre-
quently it is utilized. Overall, only 182 of the 5504 claims in 2004 were
appealed--approximately 3% of all cases. The appeals rate increases dra-
matically among cases in which no price reduction was initially awarded;
more than 25% of those (55 out of 208) were appealed. For those who
choose to appeal, their decision almost always pays. Eighty-five percent of
the 55 appealed cases that were initially denied price reductions received a
bump up to a level that triggered a price reduction. [n many cases, judges
bumped the insufficient award-7%, for example--exactly the amount
needed to enable the buyer to receive the minimum 11 % price reduction
(4%).8' In the 127 appealed cases where the initial judgment involved a
price reduction but the buyer was dissatisfied with the awarded amount, the
success rate was almost 98%. In only three of those cases did buyers fail to
improve on their original award. The average pre-appeal price reduction of
all 182 appeals brought in 2004 was 14%, and the average increase in the
awarded price reduction was 9%, resulting in an average overall price re-
duction for post-appeal cases of 23%, compared to less than 19% for all
pre-appeal cases.
With the success rate of appeals so high, one might wonder why ap-
peals are so infrequent. The answer is straightforward. Buyers freely use
the Tuna Court to resolve quality disputes, and judges express no resent-
ment that they are being asked to reduce the price of some fish. But there is
a delicate balance between what is considered a legitimate claim for a price
reduction when one's fish is damaged and an inappropriate demand that
judges provide a more substantial remedy to a problem that they may not
think is particularly severe. If buyers cross the invisible line that demar-
cates reasonable claiming from inappropriate whining, they risk a damaged
reputation and the possibility of retribution on the auction floor. So buyers
generally contain their desire to question the judgment of judges, because
too strongly expressing themselves can result in sellers denying them a
winning bid. As one seller put it, "Why would I, as the auctioneer, sell a
fish to someone who I know might loudly complain if I could sell it to
someone else? It's only natural."g2
81. When judges at the Tuna Court hear an appeal, they reexamine the fish and on their judgment
sheet write a decision that is relative to the initial detennination. If they agree with the original
detennination they write "0"; if they think that the initial determination was too low, they write a plus-
sign and then the percent by which they think the initial judgment should be increased, abiding by the
maximum 50% ceiling on price reductions.
82. The possibility of economic retribution against an unpopular buyer is not limited to Tsukiji.
Smith has described how tensions between buyers and sellers have erupted into physical violence at the
I ew Bedford Fish Exchange. See SMITH, supra note 20. at 134-35.
2006] THE TUNA COURT 345
IV
AUCTIONS, QUALITY, AND CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
This Article asks a seemingly simple question: why do Tokyo's tuna
merchants rely on the Tuna Court? In an environment where buyers and
sellers are regular and frequent transactors, how should we understand their
willingness to engage in repeated conflict? And with a range of options
from which to choose, occupying a spectrum from caveat emptor to litiga-
tion, why do parties at Tsukiji rely on a system that is so heavily imbued
with fonnal legal rules? The law-and-economics literature on infonnal
nonns among close-knit groups, with its emphasis on the efficiency of
norms, does not predict or explain the existence of an efficient, law-bound
Tuna Court. Nor does law-and-society scholarship hold the explanatory
key; the classic works on conflict among repeat players predict that infor-
mality will trump fonnality because of a disinclination to engage in face-
to-face disputing. If the most widely accepted theories of disputing fail to
explain the experience at Tsukiji, perhaps it is because there is something
distinctive about the auction of perishable products, or more specifically
the auction of tuna, that leads to a particularly unusual form of conflict
resolution. Rather than focusing exclusively on Tsukiji, therefore, some
comparative perspective may be useful in unraveling the workings of the
Tuna Court. S3
Although fish and shellfish are a more significant pal1 of the diet in
Japan than in most other nations, tuna fishing has a long history in the
United States, and tuna auctions can be found from Boston to Hawaii. 84
Many U.S. tuna auctions are relatively small, regional affairs dwarfed by
the tonnage sold at Tsukiji. But there is an exception: the Honolulu Fish
Exchange. Unlike Tsukiji, the auction in Honolulu is privately owned and
operated. On an average day in February 2005, almost 750 tuna passed
through the auction, about 25% of the amount sold at Tsukiji on a
1-;3. Bemstein argues that if norms in a panicular industry are constant across borders. despite
variations in the legal systems of different countries. it "suggests that the traditional rules and
institutions arc likely to be efficient from the perspective of market insiders." Hernskin. supra note 2.
at 157. So if one finds thai buyers and sellers at tuna aUClions outside of japan rely on a system of
dispute resolution similar to that at Tsukiji. it might be reasonable to conclude that such a system IS
paJiicularly well suited to the interests of the panies..As this Part will show. there is no such similarity.
1-;4. Average per-capita consumption of fish and shellfish in japan from 1999 to 2001 \Vas 145.7
pounds, compared [062.3 pounds in the United Slates. according to the U.S. i ational Marine Fisheries
Service. See hnp:.i..www.st.nmfs.gov1st 1ifuS/fusO") '01-;yerita2003.pdf (last visited 'V1al. 2006). The gap
is even larger for the consumption of fresh (as opposed to canned) lUna. 3n(! gre<.ltcr still for
comparisons of high-quality. sushi-grade runa For a history of albacore Illlla tishing ill Califolllia. sec
R. Michael Laurs & Ronald C. Dotson. Alhacore. in CALlfORNIA'S L!V1N(; M.·\RINI RFSOtiRCES AND
THEiR UTILIZATION, Sea Grant Extension Publication. Department or Wildlife and Fisheries Biology,
University or California. Da\'is. 136-:lX (William S. Leet et al. cds .. 1992) Among the tuna auctions In
the United States are the Portland fish Fxchange. the New England Fish Exchange. and Ihe Cilollcestcr
Seafood Display A UClion
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comparable day." In price and weight the numbers 111 Hawaii arc some-
what less robust, since individual tuna at Tsukiji are generally larger and
more expensive than those in Honolulu. Still, the Honolulu tuna auction is
a good-sized market that supplies not only Hawaii but also sends fish to the
U.S. mainland and overseas, including Japan.
The various links between Hawaii and Japan----historical, economic,
and cultural-suggest that if any U.S. tuna auction were to resemble
Tsukiji, it would be the Honolulu Fish Exchange.~6An economic analyst at
the National Marine Fisheries Service, for example, describes the fishing
industry and fish traders in Japan and Hawaii as highly similar, with both
being small, tightly organized communities that stress personal relation-
ships.x7 The two most senior administrators of the Hawaii auction are both
of Japanese descent, and the founder has worked closely with Japanese
fishing companies for over four decades and regularly travels to Japan. The
newly built auction house in Honolulu was explicitly modeled on Tsukiji,
from the 5:30 a.m. ringing of a bell (imported from Japan so that the auc-
tioneers could replicate the timbre of Tsukiji 's bell) to the method of ar-
ranging whole tuna on the auction-house floor. As in Tokyo, there is a pre-
auction inspection that allows buyers to judge the quality of the tuna. 88 If
the Tuna Court is an institution that emerges from the logic of tuna auc-
tions, then there is reason to expect a similar arrangement in Honolulu. s')
Despite the many similarities between the Tokyo and Honolulu tuna
auctions, however, the Honolulu Fish Exchange has nothing that resembles
the Tsukiji Tuna Court. In fact, disputes are extremely rare in Hawaii, to-
taling only a couple of complaints each month.l)() With approximately one
complaint for every 7500 auctioned tuna in Honolulu (15 out of 112,500),
compared to the 113-150 disputes for every 7500 tuna auctioned at Tsukiji
(15-20 out of 1000), disputing in Honolulu is 100 times less common than
85. Data provided by Unitcd Fishing J\gency (on file with author). The avcrage price of the 734
tuna sold on that day was S 1.96 per pound.
86. Just as tuna is not thc only fish auctioned at TsukiJi, there is more to the Honolulu Fish
Exchange (more accurately called United Fishing Agency, the company that lJI.vns and operates the
auction house) than tuna. Many other local species, like mahi mahi, opah, opakapaka, and ono are also
auctioned there.
87. Tclcphone Interview with Rita Curtis, Economist, :--JOAA Fisheries (.Ian. 2005) (on file with
author).
88. Buyers in Hawaii are able to inspect tuna by "digging," which mcans that they pull small
amounts of meat from the tail cut with their fingers. Because this practice can degrade the quality of
some portion of the fish but does not reveal much more about a tuna than a less invasive inspection, the
auction owners may prohibit it sometime in the future.
89. In fact, when discussing tuna auctions and conflicts with a managcr of the Globe Fish
Company in Bostol1, he said that he assumed Tsukiji and Honolulu had very similar systems for
resolving conflict. Interview with Sean Bcrgen, supra notc 36.
90. Interview with Assistant Manager, United Fishing Agency, in Honolulu Fish Exchange,
Honolulu, Haw. (Feb. 2005) (on file with author).
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in Tokyo.91 Nothing about the underlying biology of tuna determines this
result; tuna auctioned in Hawaii are just as likely to suffer the ills of para-
sites and disease as those in Tokyo, and the Hawaiian tuna dealers arc fa-
miliar with (and use Japanese words to describe) such problems. Nor are
buyers finding other ways to resolve conflict; as at Tsukiji, buyers in
Honolulu do not sue, even though contract law provides various possible
remedies for products with latent defects. The difference in the frequency
of disputing is therefore a social phenomenon, not a result of fish biology
or legal doctrine. 92
That buyers in Honolulu don't complain is closely linked to two other
critical facts: the Honolulu Fish Exchange does not provide a mechanism
for handling disputes, and those who do complain are rarely compensated.
Owners of the Hawaii auction house could potentially use their leverage
with owners, suppliers, and buyers to broker a resolution to a conflict over
the quality of auctioned tuna. But they choose not to do so, in part because
they consider such claims illegitimate. Conversations with owners and em-
ployees of the Honolulu Fish Exchange always led to the same rhetorical
claim: why, they asked, should the price of a defective tuna be reduced,
when buyers never offer to pay a supplement when they arc lucky enough
to purchase a top-grade fish at a bargain price?'I3 A similar sentiment was
expressed by buyers, only a few of whom expressed unhappiness about the
impossibility of receiving a price reduction for damaged fish. Most de-
scribed the tuna auction as a gamble that they sometimes win and some-
times lose.
In addition to the view that caveat emptor is a fair principle for the
allocation of risk, the Honolulu Fish Exchange has ce11ain characteristics
that help to explain the absence of a forum like the Tuna Court. First, there
is only one tuna auction in Hawaii, and it is privately operated. The auction
house thus enjoys a monopoly, and it exercises that power in a variety of
91 This figure IS a rough but conservative estimate. assullling 750 tuna aUL·tioned per dav for
twenty market days each month. or 15.000 tuna per month: two disputes each month amounts to a
dispute rate of.O 133%. compared to fifteen disputes per 1000 auctioned tuna at TsukiJi. or 1.5°.1,,,
92. The fact that there are fewer disputes in Ha\\'aii is not in itself evidence that it IS a
normatively betler system than one where contlicts rcgularly arise and are resohed. I take n0 position
on whether it is "beller" to rely on CU\·l.'cl/ I.'IllP{o}" or to creare an institution like the Tuna Court \11\'
point is that institutions like the Tuna Court can perf01111 e.\traordinarily well. not that they are the onlv
way to successfully manage contliet.
93 Interviews with employees llf United Fishing :'\gcncYiHonolulu Fish bchange (reb 200';)
(on file \\'ith author). According tll the owner of thc Ha\'<tii tuna auclion. he used to be somewhat morc
willing to "wLlrk with'" buyers who inadvel1cntlv purchased a damaged tuna by negotiating with the
supplicr Llr finding other ways to reduce lhe sting of a had purchase. like giving them a break of some
SOI1 when they next came to the auction. But he found th3t one good deed invited 3 rash of cl3ims and
that lazy or unskilled buyers were the Ilrst tLl dem;1nd a pricL' rcduclILln, So he let it be known to :111
buyers that claims would no longer he considered. Still. there <.Ire occasions when a buyer may come
and complain about a 1I111a that is nearly \\onhless. and if it IS a bll\er \\ho has eamed respeci and is Iwt
a whiner, he mav try \0 "work something OUI." Jd
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ways. In contrast to the 5.5%) commission established by the Tokyo
l\!Ietropol itan Government for Tsukij i auction houses. in Honolulu the
commission is 100/;), and neither suppliers nor buyers who are unhappy
with that aITangement can do much about it. Second, the size and price of
tuna in Honolulu are modest, at least compared to those in Tsukiji. Rarely
does a tuna there exceed two hundred pounds, and most are less than one
hundred, in contrast to the five-hundred-plus-pound tuna in Tokyo, where
one hundred pounds is considered a small fish. Because many of the tuna
in Hawaii sell for just a few dollars per pound, if prices were reduced as in
Tsukiji-with 11 % being the most common adjustment-it would involve
too little money to justify the trouble of bringing a claim. Third, buyers in
Hawaii, like those at Tsukiji, are repeat players, but in contrast to the sev-
eral hundred Tsukiji tuna buyers who assemble in a vast marketplace, there
are only a few dozen buyers in Hawaii who gather in a relatively cozy one-
room auction hall. To the extent that theories emphasizing the aversion to
fOlTnal conflict among members of close-knit groups have some explana-
tory power, this may be an illustration of those claims.
Fourth, whereas buyers at Tsukiji tend to represent relatively small,
family-owned enterprises that resell their tuna within the Tsukiji market,
those in Hawaii are mostly employees of marine-product wholesale com-
panies that buy at the Honolulu wholesale market and resell to distant buy-
ers. Buyers in Honolulu may therefore care less than those in Tsukiji about
price because they are buying on behalf of a company, not for their own
enterprise. In addition, in most cases a whole tuna will be resold to and
filleted by a downstream buyer, not the wholesale company that bought it
at the auction. This removes the product in time and space from the auction
company and eliminates the possibility of bringing the cut tuna to an adju-
dication session.
At any rate, in the biggest U.S. tuna auction, buyers rarely make
claims for damaged tuna, there is no written or organized system for proc-
essing claims, and price reductions are rare. Japanese buyers, in contrast,
frequently assert their right to a price reduction, a local ordinance clearly
spells out a dispute-resolution system, and it is almost guaranteed that dis-
putes will trigger a price reduction. These differences may appear incom-
patible with commonly held generalizations about dispute resolution in the
United States and Japan, but they make more sense when viewed in the
social context of the tuna auction. That is, different business structures
(family-owned vs. impersonal, private vs. public), different valuations of
the product, a different degree of sensitivity to short-term losses, and dif-
ferent presumptions about risk (caveat emptor vs. risk spreading) explain at
least in part the fundamentally different approaches to handling problems
with the quality of auctioned tuna in Tokyo and Honolulu.
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In other U.S. auction commumtIes distant from Hawaii, one finds
practices similar to those in Honolulu. There are other fish auctions, nota-
bly those in New England, where whole tuna are sometimes sold, but none
have anything that resembles the Tsukiji Tuna Court. At the Globe Fish
Company in Boston, for example, if a tuna is found to be diseased, a price
reduction or refund is unlikely to be provided unless the entire fish is unus-
able.94 An unusual system for auctioning tuna has recently been created by
the Seafood Auction Company in New Bedford, Massachusetts, which has
started what may be the world's first online tuna auction.95 Buyers can log
onto the site and see photos of the tuna that will be auctioned, and each fish
is graded according to quality. They then join a live online auction, and
their purchase is shipped to them on the same day as the sale. Unhappy
buyers have twenty-four hours to contact the seller, and in some cases they
are permitted to retum the fish or are offered a price reduction. But only
problems that involve at least 25% of the value of the fish will be consid-
ered, few complaints are made, there is not a group of judges with inde-
pendence from the seller, and there is no assurance that one's complaints
will be heard.
In fact, tllere does not appear to be a single fish or tuna auction in the
United States that has adopted an approach to the resolution of conflicts
over quality that in any way resembles the Tuna Court. 96 Instead, those in-
volved in American auctions emphasize the inherent risks of their trade and
the appropriateness of buyers bearing the risk of defects, since it is buyers
who benefit when they buy a top-quality product for an average price. 97 In
other U.S. auctions, where pre-auction inspection does not eliminate the
possibility of latent defects, one finds Honolulu-like nonns. Cattle auctions
are perhaps the best example. An auctioned cow may appear healthy, but
when it is brought to the slaughterhouse its meat may in fact be damaged.
94. Interview with Sean Bergen. supra note 36.
95. Telephone Ill1erview with Jim Levy. Seafood Auction Company. in New Bedford. "v1ass.
(Feb. 20(5) (on file with author): see also hnp:liwww.bidforfish.com.
96. Cassady's \\'ork suggests that even without inspection. the principle of t'OIWI! el1lp/or
pervades U,S. fish auctions. CASSADY. supra note 39. at 144. He \\Tites: "In some auctions (for
example. the sale of halibut in Seattle and at' tuna in San Diego) the goods are purchased sight lIlbeen.
and preauction examination of the propel1y is impossible. However. the buyer knows the reputation of
the fishing boat's master as well as the general nature of the cargo. and he may base his judgmell1 of
how high \0 go in hi, bidding on sueh information. Moreover, as he usuall, exercises some control o\er
the gradll1g of the fish at the time they are unloaded, his bidding is not entirel\' blind. Yet not all risks
are eliminated. I know of one purchaser who bought what was supposed to be medium-sized and large-
siled skippck who found lhat he had purchased mostly small fish: he incurred l'unsiderable luss
because of the lower meat yield and the added labor costs of rrocessing smaller jish. In this instance
lilt' \'endor may ha\'e misrepresented his wares. but the buyer may have heen equally culpable in nOI
being alert lO the possibility of misrepresentation," Jd. at 144.
97. Here and elsewhere. I focus on auction houses lhat deal In goods that share some essential
charaeteristics---eXlel11al inspection may not reveal illlernal dej~cts. and a single good is of sufficient
value!l) make a claim regarding that good a real possihility Vcgetahks dun't lit this paradigm. Illlr do
paintings orjewelrv.
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The most common condition is "cutting black," meaning that the meat
along the upper back will be bloody and dark, akin to what humans experi-
ence as a black-and-blue mark.9~ Even though large sections of meat may
be unusable, auction houses insist upon the responsibilities of buyers and
are unwilling to offer compensation.')') Horse auctions are similar. As one
breeder puts it:
[f I sold them [buyers] a horse directly, I'd never see the end of
them. [f the horse got lame or turned out to have no heart, they'd be
back at me, expecting me to make it up to them somehow. If the
horse turns out to be a winner they won't share their purse with me,
but if there is trouble, ['II know. I'd never be free of that horse .
. . . This way [an auction], once it is sold it is sold. I've sat next to a
friend while he was actually bidding on one of my horses. He got
her. [ said congratulations and good luck with her. Turned out she
couldn't run worth a damn, but he never said a word to me about
her. 100
Those involved in automobile auctions in the United States express a
similar sentiment. As one seller noted, "when [ sell a car [at auction], no
matter to whom I sell it, best friend or enemy, it's sold. I'm not going to
get a call the next morning that he's changed his mind or he wants some-
thing in addition.",ol Yet the refusal of U.S. auction houses to reduce the
prices of goods with latent defects has not occasioned a wave of litigation.
No buyer at the Honolulu Fish Exchange has ever sued over tuna quality,
and buyers at other fish auctions have been equally nonlitigious. 102 Nor has
the attitude of the auction houses brought about the downfall of auctions as
mechanisms for the sale of goods. Instead, without any apparent coordina-
tion between auction houses in different locales or dealing in different
98. Telephone Interview with Kevin Lambright, Shipshewana Auction, in Shipshewana, Ind.
(Feb. 2005) (on file with author). The most common cause of "cutting black" is that a heifer was
bruised when mating with a bull; it can also be caused by rough treatment by the seller, stress, and
other factors. 1iJ.
99. Most livestock auction houses have signs on the walls indicating that all animals are sold "as
is." Id. If a cattle buyer calls to complain about a cow "cutting black," Kevin Lambright of the
Shipshewana Auction in Indiana asks the buycr the date of his bil1hday, and then tells the buyer that he
is over twenty-one and is an adult who needs to take responsibility for his own decisions, like buying
products at auction.
100. SMITH. supra note 20, at 74. In Japan, the purchaser of a racehorse at auction may rescind the
sale within ten days if he discovers cel1ain types of undisclosed dcfects. See '1 2, art. 19, Operating
Rules of the Nihon K\'osoba Kyokai [Japan Racehorse Association].
101. SMITH. supro note 20, at 74.
102. A search of all cascs available via Westlaw, both federal and state, as well as searches of
legal newspaper databases, did not uncover a single case of litigation over the quality of fish purchased
at auction. The only provision of the U.c.c. that spccifically applies to auction sales is Section 2-328.
which indicates that such sales arc subject to the same rules of contract law as all othcr sales. U.c.c. §
2-328 (2004)
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products, the nonn of "buyer beware" has come to define the response of
sellers to those who buy defective goods at American auctions. IO~
It is important not to overgeneralize about the differences between the
United States and Japan when it comes to compensating those who pur-
chase defective merchandise at auctions. In Japan, like in the United States,
auction houses generally disclaim responsibility for the quality of auc-
tioned merchandise and remove themselves from conflicts that arise be-
tween buyers and sellers. 11I4 In at least one auction setting, however, the
difference between the United States and Japan is vivid: Tsukiji's Tuna
Court has no equal in the United States. lOS Tuna auctions in the United
States embrace caveat emptor, not a Tuna Couti, and U.S. cattle auctions
also put buyers at risk when it comes to latent defects. (Cattle auctions in
the United States are similar to Japanese tuna auctions. Like tuna, an exter-
nal inspection cannot fully reveal the inner characteristics of a cow; cows
are living creatures subject to a wide range of possible problems; each in-
dividual animal commands a significant market value; and beef is an essen-
tial component of the U.S. food supply and has cultural salience.)
In comparison to the management of disputes at other auctions in both
the United States and Japan, therefore, the Tuna Court is distinctive. It
cannot be described as "typically Japanese," because it does not represent
the usual way in which auction-related conflicts in Japan are resolved. Nor
is it a system that arises inevitably from tuna auctions, as the evidence
from Hawaii makes clear. Instead, like many institutions, the Tuna Court
emerged from a pariicular configuration of historical, economic, and social
factors, and it represents a response to those factors. Like New York's or-
thodox Jewish diamond dealers and California's rural cattle ranchers.
Tokyo's tuna traders have taken a particular approach to resolving conflict;
103. According to Cassady's authoritati ve work on auctions. '"The m3:\ im Ul\'eol emplor is
generally applicable to the sale of goods at auction. unless an express warranty is made."' CASSADY.
supra note 39. at 132. Cassady's research on auctions stal1ed with his studv of the fish industry and the
trade in marine products. for which he visited lish auctions throughout the world in the 1950s But he
does not mention disputes over the 4uality of auctioned fish. despite his discussion of other types of
contlicts: this suggests that he did not observe a Tsukiji-like Tuna Court during his research. 1<1. at 13.~­
34.
104. Online auction websites in both the United States and Jap<Jn. for example. offer advice to
buyers and sellers who have a dispute. but they do not directlv participle JIl adjudicating conllicls. See.
e.g .. http:;/www.ebay.com (U.S.) and hltpIwww.bidders.co.jp (Japan).
105. Though some might pl'rceive similarities between thc Tuna Coun and <In inspection system
regulating. 'orth American rohaccn sales during the scve11leenth cenlury. Ihe t\\"() arc not truly
comparable. Tobacco sellers would "nest"' low-quality tobacco within higher qualltv merchandise 10
deceive buyers. which triggered a system of inspection by English governmcnt offici<Jls. Lvcnrually.
inspectors had taken so many brihes \hal they wcrc no longer credible. so buy.-ers and sellers turned to
neighbors \() adjudicate disputes. But thai \\'as before tobacco auctions had started in the l11neteenth
ce11lur\: there is no evidence that such a system cxtended to disputes 0\ er the lJualitv or auctioned
tobacco. See Wilbur Wright Yeargin. Jr.. The History oCthc Tllbacco Auction System <Jnd The Tobacco
Auctioneer 6-1 ~ (19X9) (unpuhlished M.A. thesis. Duke University) (on tile wilh :luthnrl.
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unlike those groups, theirs is an approach that is heavily dependent upon a
formal, statutorily created institution, rather than informal nonns.
V
NORMS, LA W, AND THE Tu A COURT
The tuna market at Tsukiji provides an opportunity to evaluate the
claim that members of close-knit merchant communities will rely on effi-
cient, informal norms rather than on legal rules to order their relationships
and manage conflict. 'o6 Applied to Tsukiji's tuna traders, that claim sug-
gests that merchants are likely to reject formal legal rules because informal
norms will otTer a faster, cheaper, and simpler way of handling disputes.
In fact, there is unambiguous evidence that Tokyo's tuna dealers shun
the government's conventional legal apparatus. As John Haley demon-
strated in the 1970s, structural factors like Japan's scarcity of attorneys,
prolonged civil trials, and the expense of filing a case playa key role in
limiting litigation among all (not only close-knit) parties in Japan, and cul-
ture may also playa role in inhibiting legal conflict. 107 Factors specific to
the tuna trade, like the complexity of scheduling meetings with an attorney
and making court appearances when one works fish-market hours, in addi-
tion to the perishable nature of fish, are further disincentives to litigate. lUX
A search of Japanese legal databases does not tum up a single recorded
judicial opinion (at least since 1900, as far back as the Japanese legal data-
bases go) that involves a conflict over the quality of auctioned tuna,109 de-
spite the availability of legal rules on which to base a claim. Purchasers of
damaged tuna could bring a cause of action under Article 570 of the Civil
Code and Article 526 of the Commercial Code, which since the late 1890s
have allowed buyers of goods with latent defects either to rescind the sale
106. As Ellickson notes, "to govern their workaday interactions, members of a close-knit group
tend IO develop intormal norms whose content serves IO maximize the objective welfare of group
members." ELI.lCKSON. supra note I, at 283. Bernstein suggests that the benefits of private norms over
formal legal IUles are that they rcduce the cost and delay of oblaining a court judgment, provide a
streamlined process for disputing, and facilitate contracting. Bernstein, supra note 11, at 1740-42. For
additional insight on ew York's diamond dealers. see Daniel Lang, Pelikaans/raal Mid/own, NEW
YORKER, July 10, 1943. at 42-55
107. Haley. supra note 10; see also KAWASHIMA TAKEYOSH1, IHONJIN. 0 Ho ISHIKI,
(Tokyo: Iwanami. 1967).
108. The processing of claims at Tsukiji may appear to support the oft-made claim that
extrajudicial systems for managing conflict in Japan are one way that the state keeps disputes out of the
courts and limits the power of the judicial branch. Yet the Irigger that often leads the state to create
conflict resolution systems outside the courts-lawsuits that begin percolating through the system-is
missing at Tsukiji. where the Tuna Inspection System evolved without regard to concern about an
increase in li[igation.
109. The searches were conducted using the CD-based Hanrei Taikei system compiled by the
Daiichi H6ki Company, http://www.daiichihoki.eo.JP.
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or to obtain a price reduction commensurate with the degree of damage.! Ii)
Both of those potential remedies are more generous than the resolution pro-
vided by the Tuna Court. I II Yet the possibility of receiving a full refund for
a damaged tuna has not brought buyers to the courts. Indeed, none of the
dealers I interviewed at Tsukiji had heard of the relevant Articles of the
Civil or Commercial Codes, much less how either might be relevant to
their transactions, and they evidenced deep skepticism about litigating
cases of tuna quality.
But the reluctance of Tokyo's tuna dealers to pull their fish carts
through the streets of Tokyo in order to assert their claims at the Summary
Court or District Court does not represent a rejection of state-sponsored
law. Like all wholesale markets in Tokyo, Tsukiji is built on land owned
by the TMG, and its overall operations are regulated by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, which has jurisdiction over all
Japanese fish, vegetable, and livestock markets. 112 National legislation is
far too blunt to take into account the many differences in locales and prod-
ucts that are gennane to such locally embedded institutions. Consequently.
the detailed regulation of regional markets is left to local government, and
in the case of Tsukiji that means the TMG. Among the TMG's many ordi-
nances that set standards for the operation of Tsukiji is the one from 1972
outlining a process for compensating buyers who purchase a damaged
tuna. 113 Tuna traders have therefore turned their backs on the government's
centrally administered system of courts, but in its place they have em-
braced another form of government involvement in their relations--a
TMG-created dispute-resolution mechanism that 1 call the Tuna Court.
Of course, one's willingness to conceptualize the system at Tsukiji as
a cOUl1 depends at least in part upon how "court" is defined. Clearly, the
Tuna Court does not confonn with what Martin Shapiro calls the
"prototype" of courts-institutions where independent judges apply
I 10. Civil Code of Japan. art. 570; Commercial Code of Japan, aJ1. 526 (originally Article ~XX)
("In the case of a sale between merchaIlls, the buyer shall. upon taking delivery of the subject maller.
examine it without delay, and if he discovers any defects therein or any deficiency in quantity he shall
immediately dispatch notice thereof to the seller: otherwise he has no right to canct'l the cOnJracl. to
demand a reduction in the price or to claim damages."). Commercial Code of Japan (Eibun Hf>rel-sha
trans .. Tokyo. Japan. 2004). On the general duty of inspection. see ECASIIIRA KENJIR(). StJ(1I0RIHIKIH(1
~6-33 (Tokyo Kobund6.2002)
II I The Tuna Court docs not allow buyers at Tsukiji to rescind the sale. and it pnl\idcs
compensation for only 50% of the value of the damage
112 The ChiirJ Oroshiuri Shill) Hi) [Central Wholesale Market LawJ. first passcd in 1923 and
revised in 1971, authorizes the Ministry of AgncullUre. Forestry and fisheries to scl standards for the'
operation and licensure of wholesale markets. and it authorizes the use of auctions to sell 1lsh. nut it
does not go into great detail about the operation of particular markets: that is len to local government,.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government's ordinance that outlines the operation or all wholesale market>
in the city IS Tokro-III Chiia ()rvshiuri Shij6 Hi5rei [Tokyo's Central \Vhoiesale \1arket Ordinance J. S,·,-
hur-.\'v\\\\ _rei ki .Illctro.tokyojplreikl_honbunJag 10 I I 14~ I .htm!.
113. The ordlllance also covers s\\·ordfish. but the volume of s\\'ord1ish is J\\·art\.'d lw Ihat pr runa
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preexisting legal norms after hearing adversary proceedings, with the goal
of making a dichotomous decision that one party is legally in the right and
the other is legally in the wrong.ll~ But as Shapiro argues, the prototype
fails to describe the vast majority of institutions that we call ··courts."""
Instead, courts exist on a spectrum; beyond a common dispute-resolution
logic that entails the use of third parties to resolve conflicts. they take
many forms and incorporate a variety of features. 116 Marc Galanter and
John Lande have pointed to an array of features that make courts more or
less "public" or "private," with "public" resembling the prototype critiqued
by Shapiro. To distinguish between the publicness and privateness of
courts, they offer criteria that include access to and location of the proceed-
ings, as well as personnel, funding, review, substantive norms, and proce-
dures. lli
Using these definitions and criteria as a matrix, what is the best way
to classify Tsukiji's dispute-resolution institution? On the one hand, the
TMG ordinance is quite specific in detailing the operation of the Tuna
Court. It prohibits buyers from bringing claims that involve fish that cost
less than ¥120/kilo, and requires that when buyers make claims they must
cut their fish into at least four pieces before presenting it to the judges. It
prescribes a system for selecting judges and outlines the supervisory au-
thority of the TMG. It provides the substantive rules that control the pro-
ceedings, limiting price reductions to between 11 % and 50%. It offers a
system of appeal. Like most courts, it occupies a specific location on gov-
ernment land, and precedent matters. The rules for handling disputes at
Tsukiji are thus state law, which is interpreted and imposed by a special-
ized public court.
114. MARTIN SHAPIRO, CUURIS: i\ COMPARATIVE AN!) POLlTlC,<\L ANAl.YSIS (1901). Roben
Summers raises a number of concerns nbout H.L.A. Han's view of couns that echo Shapiro's rejection
of thc prototype of couns. See Raben S. Summers, Legal Insliluliolls in Prufessor H.L.A. Harl's
COl1cepl ofLa\\', 7S NOTRE DAME L. RF\'. IS07 passim (2000).
115. In Shapiro's vic\\', Ihe mOSI impol1ant quality of a coun is that it involves a conflict
structured as a triad, in which two panics appeal to a third party to help them resolve their differences.
SHAPIRO, supra note 114. at I,
116. lei
117. Although Galamer and Lande emphasize thc many dimensions along which courts may vary,
they nonetheless provide a tentative ddinilion of a public court, which they say is "an institution
constituted and operated by rublic (gu\'ernmcntal) authority that determines rights or entitlements and
rcsolves claims according [() publicly aulhorlzed nonns, in judicial form, whose decisions are backed
up by public force." Marc Galantcr & John Landc, Privale Couris and Public AUlhoril)" 12 STUD. IN
L., POL. & SOC' Y 393, 298-99 (1992). Richman offers a somewhat simpler distinction between public
and private ordering: "public ordering employs the coercivc power of the state. to which all actors are
subject and relies on standard contract law and litigation rules. In contrast, private ordering relies on
reputation mechanisms, which can induce only members of a merchant community to comply, and
exhibits separately created law and selected judges," Richman. supra note 7. at 2340 GalanteI' and
Lande's more complex matrix belter cartures the many dimensions along which dispute-resolution
institutions vary, and it is therefore mure helpful in thinking about the attributes of the Tuna Court. See
Galanter & Lande, supra at 399.
2006] THE TUNA COURT 355
On the other hand, the Tuna Court incorporates a number of features
that are more typical of private courts: only certain types of parties have
access to the Tuna Court, the proceedings are not open to the public, the
industry-supplied judges are paid by private parties, and there are no public
records. If one's definition of a court is limited to the prototype described
and rejected by Shapiro, then the Tuna Court is a different kettle of fish.
There are obvious differences between Tsukiji's dispute-resolution forum
and courts like the United States or Japanese Supreme Court, just as there
are between the Tuna COUli and standard trial courts. IIX But if one accepts
that there are many different types of courts that manifest a variety of fea-
tures, including public coulis like supreme courts. housing courts, and
small-claims couliS, as well as the range of institutions that Galanter and
Lande call "private courts" (court-annexed arbitration, rent-a-judge sys-
tems, "embedded tribunals" like the NCAA's Committee on Investigations,
and others), then the question is not whether the Tuna Court is a comi but
rather what kind of court it is. J 19
One way to analyze the Tuna Court's "coUl1ncss" is by analogy to the
merchant law of the Middle Ages, the so-called lr:>x mercatoria. Over the
past several decades, scholars have been drawn to the study of merchant
law, which they have seen as a possible model for the management of con-
temporary transnational trade disputes.l~o Similar to Tsukiji's Tuna Com1,
the lex mercaToria handled conflicts between merchants in bodies that were
presided over by merchant-judges. Where le.1" nwrcaToria and the Tuna
Court differ is \vith regard to jurisdiction; unlike the Tuna Court, which
controls a relatively narrow band of cases in the Tokyo fish market, the lex
mercatoria is most often treated as a trans-industry and transnational set of
norms not targeted at a particular type of business. In addi tion, and perhaps
more importantly, the merchant law of the Middle Ages is generally seen
as having been largely autonomous from the state, and its decisions were
enforced by industry boycotts and expulsion.I:'1 The Tuna Court owes its
existence to a govemmental ordinance; its decisions are enforced by the
II g. Some schlJlars haye treated thc creation of cOlllmon-law prl'L'l'dent as a critical function of
courts. Thc Tuna C,)Un clearly Ellis short of that goal. 51'1'. e.g .. O\\-cn 'VI. fiss . .{!!;oillsl SI'/Ill:'l11l:'iI/. 93
YALE L..I. 1073 (19~41
119. Galanter & Lande. slIlim nOll' 117. at -lOn-07. For an an,l!YSIS of small-claims CLluns. see
Roselle L Wissler, Medialil)lI alld Adjlldicalion in 1111' Small CI"illls COllrt the F}/i>cIs o(Process alld
Cus!:' Characll:'rislics. 29 LAW & Soc')" REV. 323 ( 1995). For an examination of onL' type of speCialized
court. see Susan Ell'\'. ('hunging ['rudices. The Si7!:'cialised f)I)}I/('.\lic / ·iolenc,. Court Process. 44
HOVv·ARD.I. CRIM. JV.. j 113 (2UU5).
120. S"l:', e.g .. Svmposiulll. fhc Empirical alld T!worelinJ! ende/pinnings ajlhe La\\' .HerchUI7/. ~
CHI. J. It,n·1. L. I (2U04): Raben D. Cnotl'r. f)"c(,I1I}"(/li~ed La\\ .fin· u Cmllpler EnJl7olllr' The
Slr1Iclllral Appmw'h 10 Adjlldicaling Ihe N<!\\· 1.0\\' MerchOI7/. 14-l (' p.,. L. RI'\". 1643 ( 1995): Paul R.
Milgram. Douglass ( NOJ1h & BaITy R. Weingasl. The Role or Inslilillions ill Ihe R",·inJ! af
Trade: Th" La,,' Mercholli. Primle J/ldges, lind Ihe Chwllpoglle Fairs. :' Ecol'. & p( lL. I (19L)())
12 J. One such analysis is Christopher R. Drallllzai. (·Ol7/rUd/ll'!, Oil! o( Nalwllo! 1.0\\· ·111
Fl17pirical Look (II Ihe "e\\ Lu" ,HerchUI7/. :-:0 "i()1 RI·. D., ~'11· I.. RI' \. ~ 23 (20()S l.
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state; and in a variety of other ways (discussed above) it is a creature of the
statc.I~2 Yet in spite of their comparatively weak link to govelllmcnt, the
scholarly literature unifonnly refers to the merchant tribunals of the Middle
Ages as courts. I ~;
Another set of institutions that can be usefully compared to the Tuna
Court are problem-solving courts.I~4 Partly as a result of studies by the U.S.
Depariment of Justice, New York and other states have in recent years cre-
ated problem-solving courts targeted at social issues like drug abuse, do-
mestic violence, mental illness, and homelessness. 125 Those coming before
such courts arc called "clients" rather than defendants, and judges who are
trained in the subject matter of the court get deeply involved in the details
of their clients' livcs. 126 Yet the encounters occur in traditional courthouses,
and judges are attired in their usual judicial robes. ln Like merchant courts,
problem-solving courts are, along a variety of dimensions, less "public"
than the Tuna Court; they are thus elongating the spectrum of what counts
as a court, and they point to the fluid and dynamic nature of dispute-
resolution institutions.
Related to the continuum of publicness and privateness that character-
izes courts, dispute-resolution mechanisms are also arrayed along a spec-
trum of formality. 12K The contemporary literature on law and norms tends
to treat fonnality and infonnality dichotomously, designating state-created
law and state-supervised courts as "formal" while calling the n01111S of
122. Recently. however, a number of anieles have argued for a stronger link between merchant
norms and state law than had previously been acknowledged. See. f'.g.. Emily Kadens, Order Within
LOll'. Varif'll' ~Vilhill Cuslom: The Charaeler of the Medieval lvlerclwnl La\\', 5 CHI. J. [NT·1. L 39
(2004); Stephen E. Sachs, Fmlll SI. lvI's 10 C)'berspace: The Modem Dis/()uion o{lhe Medieval ."[(/)\'
J'vlerclwl7!" Yak Law School Student Scholarship Series. Paper 5. 2005, 01
http://lsLnellco.org'yale/student/papers/5.
123. Cooter writes. "The merchants in the medieval trade fairs of England developed their own
courts and practices to regulate trade." Cooter, supra note 3, at 1647.
124. See. e.g. Timothy Casey, When Good In/en/iuns are NOi Enough: Problem-Su!l'ing COIII'!S
and the III/pending Crisis u/Legilimacl', 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 1459 (2004): Michael C. Dorf& Jeffrey A.
Fagan, Pruhlem-So!l'ing Courts: From Innovalion 10 Instill/lionaliallion. 40 AiVl. CRIM. L. REV. 150 I
(2003): Symposium. Prohlem Sulving COUl'1s: From Adversul'iu! Litigation 10 Jnnovalive
Jurispl'lldencc. 29 FCHWH.\M Urm. L.J. 1755 (2002).
125. St'e L.eslie Laton & Leslie Kaufman, Judges Turn Therupisl in Problem-So/l'ing Court, N.Y.
TilES. Apr. 26. 2005. at A I. In New York, for example, there are 138 drug-treatment courts, 37
dedicated to domestic violence. 5 for mental health, and I for homelcssness, and in the ncar future 3
problem-solving courts will be created to manage sex offenders. Id
126. Id
127. Id
128. For a similar approach to the continuum between formality and infonnality, see Regina
Austin. OJ Pl'eduII)J:\' Lending and the Democratizalion o{ Credil Pl'esen'ing the Social Safety Net o{
In/clrlnolit)' in Small-Loan Trol7Soctions, 53 AM. U. L. REV 1217 (2004), describing lending
transactions as existing on a spectrum from formal to informal and arguing that the selection of a more
or less formal type of transaction has a cultural basis. For the best analysis of Japanese legal
"informality:' see UI·H·\~1. supra note 10.
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close-knit groups "info1l11al."J29 But there is no bright line separating those
types of interactions. On one side of the continuum, one might imagine
state-sponsored rules, perhaps those promulgated by national assemblies or
supreme courts, followed by the rules created by local governments, re-
gional and specialized courts, and village councils. The other side of the
continuum may start with the norms of the family, alongside of which are
institutional norms of various types (like school and workplace nmms),
community norms, regional norms, and even national norms. 130 But from
one end of the spectrum to the other, one finds a mix of the formal and the
infOlmal, the normative and the positive. The interactions between and
among legislators and judges, for example, are powerfully shaped by
"informal social regularities" that they feel obligated to follow, and which
affect their formal rulemaking by defining the acceptable limits of their
behavior. 13 ! Likewise, the n01l11-laden rules that shape family interactions
have clements offOlmality, sometimes articulated by the head of the family
himself c; herself (negotiated curfews, prohibited acts, prescribed punish-
ments) and sometimes pronounced by the state (surrogate decision making,
inheritance). Somewhere along the spectrum, one may seek to justify a
demarcation between f01l11al and informal; indeed, it is difficult to concep-
tualize the relationship between different types of social ordering without
such a demarcation. Nonetheless, it is critical to recognize that "formal"
and "infonnaJ" do not exist as mutually exclusive categories: each contains
elements of the other. Like the definition of a court, the designation of
"fonnal" or "infollllal" depends upon the answer to the question,
"Compared to what?"
The intertwining of the fOllllal and the informal is well illustrated by
Tsukiji's dispute-resolution mechanism. Just as the avoidance of national
courts docs not signify the rejection of public law, the embrace of the
TMG's Tuna Court does not mean that informal norms are unimportant in
the resolution of conflict benveen tuna merchants. One can identify a vari-
ety of norms that affect the operation of the Tuna Court. Buyers, for exam-
ple, are invariably polite to each other. They never try to make a case for a
129 lor two recent contributions to that literature. sec Elizabeth A. Htl!Tmann. Dis!IIII" Rf!so!'lIi()n
in a Worker Coo!Jcrulil'e: Forl11l1! Proc"dures ond Procedural Jusliet'. ~lj 1.,\\\' &: Soc' Y REV. 51
(2005): Susan M. Olson &: Alben W. [)zur. R('\'isiling lnfimnol Jusliec: RCSlOrmi\'e .Iuslicc lind
Del110crulic ProfL'ssionu!isl11. 3X L\ W &: Soc' Y REV. 139 (2004)
130. (jalanter usefully explains the relationship between "official la\'·· and "indigenous la\,·.·· as
"equiring "roJne Ito] imagine a scalc wilh pure types al either end. At the oftiL'ial ·cxogenous· end
might be formal \\Til1en rules rcmote from cveryday understandings. cnuncl;Jted lw !lamed specialists.
enforced hy govclllmenl;J! coercion. /\1 the indigenous end would he simple ("') ruks. close III
everyday perceptions. applied h\' non-specialists intell1alized by the panil·,panls and cnforced by
diffuse social pressure." (J;Jlantn. slIpr" note h, at 18 n.25.
131. I am quoting from \~cAdallls's dcllnitJon of norms as "inf'1rlllal ,oclal regulanlies that
individuals feel obligated to folio\\" becausc of an internalized scnse of dll1\. because or <l rear of
external nlln-kgal sanctions. or both.·' McAdams. slipru note 3. al .,40.
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high price reduction by comparing their (worthy) claim with another
buyer's (frivolous) claim. They avoid bringing tuna with marginal prob-
lems. They defer to the initial decisions of judges, which greatly limits the
frequency of appeals. Numerous norms also shape the behavior of judges
and administrators. Although the TMG ordinance does not specify how
Court decisions are to be communicated. for example, a norm of openness
has developed, and judges ShOllt each verdict so that all who are present
can hear the decision. Norms are also important to the determination of
price reductions. The cbief judge is given wide latitude in reaching a final
judgment so that he can try to find a number that "feels right" rather than
strictly following the ordinance and averaging the judges' scores.
Moreover, the Tuna Court's very existence likely depends on social
norms. Although it is difficult to verify, for instance, the principle that the
risk of latent defects should be borne by both buyers and sellers may have
started as a market norm and been formalized as a legal rule in the TMG
ordinance. And norms that bear on trust and reputation help to keep buyers
and their disputes within the market's dispute-resolution mechanism. 132
Along a number of important dimensions, therefore, the government-
controlled dispute-resolution process at Tsukiji resembles a public, formal
court; however, like many courts, it is interwoven with community norms.
Contrary to the view that in1'01111al norms and formal rules are mutually
exclusive, Tsukiji's Tuna COUl1 is an expression of both. The Tuna Court
thus defies predictions that members of close-knit merchant groups will
reject formal, public courts and laws in favor of informal group norms.
Instead, fonnal law-bound procedures playa central role in the interactions
of tuna traders and govern their management of disputes; compared to
ranchers and diamond dealers, tuna traders have opted for a high degree of
legal fonnality. Yet the presence of fonnal legal rules is compatible with
many nonns that inevitably shape their behavior.
There is an additional way that the Tuna Court challenges past schol-
arship on close-knit merchant communities. Although there is considerable
disagreement among scholars of the Japanese legal system about how best
to explain Japan's low litigation rate, one rare area of consensus is that the
assertion of rights and the resort to formal means of resolving disputes is
particularly infrequent among repeat players with regular future interac-
tions.!.\3 In fact, that claim is commonplace among American law-and-
132. It is difficult to know which if any of thesc llonns predate the Tuna Court, since they may
have emerged as a consequence of the Court. But it appears that the creation of the Court by thc TMG
was at kast in part a response to a requcst from tuna traders. so the Tuna Court is itselfan expression of
their llonns.
133. For accounts of Japan's low litigation rates, see Haley, supra note 10; Kawashima, supra
note II): Ramseyer, silpra note 10. For an overview and critique of the U.S. litt:rature on disputing and
ongoing relationships, see CalY Coglianese. Lilig{[fing /-Vilhill ReI{ilionships: Disputes and Dislurnance
ill the Rf!gll!alol:l' Process. 30 LAW & Soc' Y Rio\'. 7.') ( 19(6).
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society scholars. StewaI1 Macaulay's widely cited work on Wisconsin
businessmen argues that their desire to maintain a future relationship leads
them to rely on info1l11al methods of resolving disputes, and Marc
Galanter's study of U.S. litigation patterns emphasizes that parties with
continued dealings avoid using formal legal rules to resolve disputes be-
cause it risks severing their relationship.134 Such views have been repeated
and amplified by other socio-legal scholars, particularly anthropologists
and sociologists who have studied conflict in discrete American communi-
ties. 135
Such well-considered analyses are contradicted by the fact that
Tsukiji's tuna traders have adopted a system that encourages buyers to as-
sert a right to compensation in the approximately seven thousand claims
they bring each year. It is crucial to note that tuna traders are not required
to bring their complaints to the Tuna Court. If they desired, buyers and
sellers could resolve their conflicts privately. They could agree, under the
auspices of their trade associations, to avoid the market's Tuna Court by
imposing the cost of poor-quality fish on buyers. Or they could make sell-
ers wholly responsible for quality problems. If they considered infonnality
critical to positive future business dealings, they could avoid the TMG's
formal court proceedings and opt for a different approach to dispute resolu-
tion. Yet tuna traders have come to depend upon a system that is more
formal and rule oriented than many alternatives, and which involves clear,
persistent, and direct disputing. They do so, I claim, for two reasons. first
and most apparently, the Tuna Court is an efficient way of handling prob-
lems with the quality of auctioned tuna. Second, it plays a critical role in
creating and preserving order in the marketplace. The following Part ex-
plores these two advantages.
VI
WHY A TUNA COURT? EFFICIENCY AND THE CREATION OF
COMMUNITY
As Part V noted, studies of business dealings within close-knit COlll-
mercial groups emphasize the efficiency of resolving conflict by means of
informal nornlS. Such claims do a poor job of explaining the dispute-
resolution process at Tsukiji. The most distinctive characteristic of the
Tuna Court is its legal formality. Although the Tuna Court in part owes its
134, Macaulay, supro note 7: Marc (j3Iant~r. Reuding Ihe Land,cupe o!f)ispllles: II'hol Il"e AIlO"
und Dun 'I f.:IlU\\' (olld Think We Knu\\') ..lhoUf Our Alleged/)' COI1lf:nfio/!S alld Liligious Socii'fL' I
UCLA L RLV, 4 (198»)
135, See, e,g.. CARUI J, (jREEr--:H()l'~F, BARIIARA YN(;VE~~Ui'i & D'\\'!IJ M, E, (;E! .. L,\\\ "'''I>
CO 1MU"iJT\ IN THREI-, /\MERlcAI-J T()WN~ (\994): David M, F.ngcL lill' (hell BinI's SOil,!!. IIl.\iden,
OUfsiJer,\, and I'ersonallnjllries in an AlJiericolI C0ll11111117il1', J X L'\w & SO('y I{E\', )~ I (!9X4): Salh
Engle \~crry, Cuing /() ('(JUri: SlI'ufcgies of f)iSl-'lIfi' :lfunugelli('11/ in <Ill ,,!nwriculi ('rhilll
,\'cighhIJrh()oJ, 13 L'\\\ & SO("y REV, X91 (]979).
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existence to the nonns of tuna traders at Tsukiji, traders did not choose to
rely only on the unwritten practices and values of their profession that had
been created and reshaped over generations. Tuna traders' infom1al norms
undoubtedly influenced their approach to dispute resolution--even the
shared acknowledgement that there was a problem in need of a solution
renects the influence of trade norms. But when it really mattered, they
turned to the government for rules and structures that could facilitate the
resolution of conflict. In effect, they turned their backs on informal norms
(perhaps because they were inadequate, or contested, or for some other rea-
son; the historical record is insufficient to say), and moved away from what
some scholars suggest is a particularly efficient way of handling conflict.
Instead, they dragged the state into their conflicts, just as they drag their
tuna to the Tuna Court. 136
The government-administered Tuna Court imposes certain costs on
the parties. To make a complaint, buycrs--generally the owners of small,
family-operated companies-must take thirty to forty-five minutes away
from their wholesale stalls during peak market hours to bring their fish to
the Tuna Court and await a decision. Sellers, namely the five Tsukiji tuna
auction houses, adjudicate the cases, so they must provide personnel who
might otherwise spend more time on more obviously profitable activities.
Market administrators oversee every claim, record the decisions, and in-
fom1 all parties of the adjusted price; this requires extensive paperwork and
consumes staff hours.
Nonetheless, such costs are modest when compared to what the Court
provides. Buyers who bring their damaged fish to the Tuna Court obtain a
rapid and almost automatic price reduction of between 11 % and 50%. The
entire process takes much less time than the average Tokyo commute. No
lawyers or representatives are needed, there are no case-filing fees, and the
only relevant evidence is a single fish (and the price that the buyer paid for
it). Fact finding involves nothing more than five judges who inspect the
disputed tuna, and their skill at doing so enables buyers to feel confident
that they are being treated fairly. [n short, Tsukiji's tuna traders appear to
be engaged in a highly efficient system for resolving conflict, even though
it is dominated by formal legal rules and procedures. They use the Tuna
Court because they believe that the rewards considerably outweigh the
costs. 137
136. It is also possible (but unlikely) that the Tuna Couli was imposed by the government without
any bottom-up demand from tuna merchants, Based on the thin historical record and my conversations
with merchants, it seems that there was some sentiment among tuna buyers and sellers that government
involvement was desirable, but it is possible that the Court was more a consequence of government
initiative than of merchant demand.
13 7. These claims are consistent with Cary Coglianese's "disturbance theory" of disputing See
Coglianese, supra note 133, at 758-62.
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The finding that Japanese disputants will turn to the legal system
when they think that they have something to gain confirms the claims of
others who have studied conflict in Japan. Whether relying explicitly on a
rational-choice perspective or taking a broader political or sociological ap-
proach, recent scholarship consistently emphasizes that individuals in
Japan have no inherent hesitation about bringing their claims to court. 13X
Indeed, the Tuna Court is exactly the type of court that one would expect
litigants to favor. Its ability to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently
makes it more attractive than alternative dispute-resolution techniques, so
that even the predictability of its decisions (almost half of all cases reach
the same 11 % result) has not led tuna merchants to resolve their claims in
the shadow of Tuna Court law.
But the promise of a fast and inexpensive solution to the problem of
overpaying for a poor-quality fish is not the only reason for the frequent
use of the Tuna COUli. Tanase Takao, an influential legal academic, echoes
the views of some American legal analysts in expressing skepticism about
the social consequences of rights assertion and conflict. J39 As he puts it,
"appeals to rights interrupt the flow of everyday social interaction and
create tensions in social relationships [in Japan] ... rights talk inevitably
constructs subjects into abstracted identities lacking a communitarian
ethos. "140 By focusing on the corrosive effect of formal disputing on the
bonds of community, however, Tanase underemphasizes an alternative un-
derstanding of rights, conflict, and community. The Tuna COUli at Tsukiji
is an example of the centrality of rights and conflict in the creation of so-
cial order. By facilitating buyers' assertions of rights and airing of dis-
putes; providing mild, community-preserving remedies rather than all-or-
nothing, punitive, existence-threatening judgments; and downplaying the
potentially divisive consequences of too much "rights talk," the Tuna Court
serves to strengthen the ties between tuna traders that are essential to the
successful operation of the market. J4! Rather than splintering relationships
13X John O. Haley. l.iliguliol1 in .JUPUII: A Ne\\·I.ook ulOId Prohll'lIls. 10 WII.I.AMETTE J. INT'I.
L. & Dtsp. RESOL. 121. 12R (2002): Ramseyt:r & Nakazaw, supra note 21.
139. Tanase is best kno\\'n to the English-reading world for hi~ work on aUlOmobile accident
disputes. Tanase, supra note 15. A selection of his voluminous Japanese-language writings has reccntly
been translated and will be published in 2006. For a general discussion of his work. see Veronica
Taylor. The Scholarship or Takao Tanase. Presentation at the 2005 Sho Saw Conference on Japanese
Law. Boalt Hall. nivcrsity of California. Berkeley (Feb. 11-13,2005) (on tile with author). His vic\\'
or rights and community is inllul'nced by MARY Al'N GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVI'RISH\tENT
Or PI .L1TIC ..\1. DISCOURSE ( 1991)
140 Takao Tanase. Righls und Communill' (fonhcoming 2006) (untitled manuscript on thl'
Japanese legal system, 011 file with author).
J 4\ ./\ study of the loI-Jster industry ill Maine. which relies OJ) thl' litcraturl' Oil relatiOllal
contr3cting. similarly emphaSIZes the impOli3TlCe to those \\'orkll1g in the industry of reducing friction
between actors to facilitate the o[1eratioll of the markct. Social and cultural 1'clctors. at least in some
cases, trump market rationality See JA!VtES M. ACHLSUI'i. THE LOBSTER CAN«, Ill' MAINE (19XX). For
all Oil overvic\\' of relational cOlllracting, see THE RFl.ATION,\L THEORY ClI· CCl'JTRA( T: SFI.F(·t 1'1)
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and incurring unjustifiable costs, the process at Tsukiji neutralizes the
negative feelings that often accompany litigation in the United States, and
instead is essential to the maintenance of an ordered marketplace. I -l 2 Stated
differently, the fonnal rules for resolving conflict over defective goods at
Tsukiji, embodied by the Tuna Court, succeed in diffusing a variety of ten-
sions that would otherwise inhibit the operation of the tuna auction.
Tsukiji's Tuna Court thus fulfills a number of functions. Not only does it
serve to resolve discrete disputes, but it also tasters positive relationships
between tuna traders and enables goods to rapidly flow through the mar-
ketplace.I-l'
The effectiveness of Tsukiji's Tuna Court in creating and maintaining
order does not suggest the absence of personal animosity or the suppres-
sion of competition among tuna traders. Those are inevitable and enduring
features of any complex marketplace. Instead, "order" refers to a set of
qualities that enable the auction to operate in a way that best serves the in-
terests of all parties. Among the qualities that constihlte order, trust is no-
table.'-l-l Without trust, buyers would be less willing to rely on the seller's
pre-auction grading of tuna; they would be suspicious of how auctioneers
conducted the auction; and sellers would lack confidence in the behavior of
buyers engaged in tuna inspection and in other circumstances. Such con-
cerns would affect the overall atmosphere of the market, and they would
also slow its operation. '-l
5 And in a business where the freshness of the
product is cmcial to its value, getting tuna quickly from the auction floor to
the table is of the utmost concern.
WORKS or \!\!' MM·NEII. (David Campbell cd., 200 I) An excellent Japanese compilation on relational
contracting is KEIYAKU HORI TO KEIYAKU K!\NK() [PRINCIPI.F.S OF CONTRACT AND PRACTICES OF
CO TRACT) (Tanase Takao cd., Kobundo 1999).
142. Many buyers start and end their professional lives at Tsukiji, as do some of the sellers. A
relatively smaiL insular group of individuals run the tuna auction, and they arc proud of what they do
and extremely good at it. For them, the atmosphere of the market and the interactions between buyers
and sellers is a central part of their lives. So they care about maximizing order and minimizing tension
for the same reason that most people prefer a congenial workplace to one that is poisoned with mistrust
and hostility. For a discussion of the legal consequences of hostile relations, see Ward Farnsworth, Till!
Economics olEnll1ill·, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (2002).
143. One can also think of the tuna auction at Tsukiji as a place where buyers are essentially
paying for a tuna that comes with an insurance policy that covers some of the loss from latent defects.
which is more dTective than private insurance because it involves a group of arbitrators and thus limits
the risk of moral hazard (which might lead buyers to be less careful when inspecting and bidding for
tuna). [ am grateful to Robert Kagan and Chris Sanehirico for raising this issue.
144. The importance of trust is not limited to Tsukiji. but is an imp0l1ant feature of most auctions
and other commercial interactions. In U.S. livestock auctions. ·'spotters" point out defects in animals
about to be auctioned, and buyers expect that defects will be revealed. Robert E. Clark, On the
Block: An Ethnography of Auctions 41-76 (Aug. 1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Montana) (on file \vith author) (discussing the role of trust in U.S. livestock auctions).
145. Time is of the essence in all auctions, in part because auctioneers try to create a rapid pace
that enables them to maximize the number and price of auctioned goods. lei. at 77.
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The existence and operation of Tsukiji's Tuna Court promotes order
and contributes to the successful functioning of the tuna trade in at least
five ways. First, the very fact that there is an outlet for the resolution of
disputes plays a role in the creation of a stable market environment.'-lo Like
studies of procedural justice in the United States that highlight the impor-
tance to litigants of having their day in court, dispute resolution at Tsukiji
gives those who are unlucky a chance to air their concems. 147 They can
take their fish to Court, complain to the sellers, and commiserate with other
dissatisfied buyers. In that way, the Tuna Court is like a corner cafe where
merchants blow off steam about the lousy fish they bought in front of a
captive audience of other buyers and judges who not only listen but also
provide financial relief The high rate of claiming at Tsukiji (1.5% to 2% of
all tuna sales) and the similar frequency with which claims are brought for
the most and least valuable fish point to the Tuna Court's function as a
venue for conflict, not simply a mechanism that provides financial relief.
Without such an outlet, frustration over defective fish would simmer, and it
could manifest itself in ways that might diminish the good will on which
the auction depends.
Second, the system for resolving conflict at Tsukiji privileges the
value of expertise, the most important cunency of the tuna market. If there
were no opportunity to assert and resolve claims about allegedly hidden
defects in tuna, there would be ambiguity as to whether those who pur-
chased damaged goods were unlucky or were unskilled evaluators of tuna
quality, and such ambiguity would be corrosive to market relationships.14x
The vital bond that links the community of tuna traders is their finely tuned
knowledge of tuna; it is what limits entry to the trade, breeds and defines
respect, enables conversations, determines grading and price, and ulti-
mately detennines which buyers will flourish and which will fail. l .19 As a
forum for resolving disputes, the Tuna Court brings together dozens of
people daily-at least twenty-five buyers, several TMG officials, perhaps a
dozen or more representatives from the five auction houses--who for sixty
minutes (four sessions of fifteen minutes each) engage in a series of
146. This provides at least a panial <:xplanation for why so Illany cases arc brought 10 the Tuna
Coun. One might assume that the predictability of the Tuna Coun"sjudglllenls would lead merchants 10
resolve their claims "in the shadow" of the Tuna Coun's substantive rules. But the low cost (in tcrlllS of
time and trouble) lJf using the Court. along with its other benefits. discussed in/i·lI. lead buvcrs and
sellers to utilize the coun itself rather than allempting to replicate its outcoilles through inl(JrInalmeans.
147. On the imponance 10 disputants of having their "day in coun" see E. ALLAN LI. 'I) & TOM R.
TYI.ER. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL Jt.'SI"JCE (1988).
148. Therc is some overlap here with v,.-hat BClllstein and others call "reputation'" Bem,tein . .\11/),.0
note 2.
149. At Tsukijl. for example. there ar~ not generic eel dealers, but some who ,necialil.e in
freshwater eel and others in saltwater eel: there are not shellfish sellers. but sellers of shrimp and sellers
of uysters. Business and social relations. linancial as well as familial tics. are shaped h,' \\'hat one do~s.
and how ",·ell one doc,.; it.
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conversations about tuna diseases, handling, and storage. 1511 Everyone in
attendance can look at the fish that have been brought to court, and the
judges' verdicts are loudly and publicly announced, a form of shaming for
those who bring spurious claims and a reward for those who do not. [n a
sense, each dispute-resolution session serves as a mini-seminar, where ex-
perts trade knowledge about an issue that is at the core of their livelihood
and provide each other with the equivalent of "CTE"--continuing tuna
education. The reward for participation is that so long as there is some
merit to the claim, a price reduction will be offered, though it is likely to be
only II % unless the fish is virtually unusable, in which case the buyer will
save 50% of the bid price.
The premium placed on expertise explains why the Tuna Court enter-
tains no-fault claims and why almost every claim is compensated. The un-
stated norm of disputes about quality at Tsukij i is that if one is in doubt
about whether a tuna is defective, it is better to refrain than to complain.
During the time that I observed the resolution of conflicts at Tsukiji, there
was only one occasion when a buyer brought a tuna before the judges and
was greeted with raised eyebrows. It was a large fresh fish-over 500
Ibs-and one of the most expensive purchases of the day. The buyer was
concerned that it was diseased, but within seconds of examining it all five
judges concluded that it was fine. The buyer was embarrassed; he had
complained about what everyone thought was a perfectly good product,
and in the process had raised questions about his judgment and expertise.
As the judges made a few sarcastic remarks, the buyer talked with the
TMG's supervisor and withdrew his complaint, saying that he would look
in more detail at the fish and would return if he saw further evidence of a
problem. '51
Bringing meritless claims does not suggest dishonesty, but it suggests
something equally undesirable: it raises the possibility that the complainant
lacks the degree of expe11ise needed to be a player in the tuna trade.
Appeals are also closely linked to expertise, with their infrequency in part
explained by the reluctance of buyers to challenge the expertise of sellers,
and their high success rate reflecting the willingness of sellers to acknowl-
edge the expe11ise of buyers by ratcheting up the price reduction in cases
about which buyers feel strongly enough to appeal. Beyond a system for
resolving disputes, therefore, Tsukiji's Tuna Court offers buyers and sellers
150. As noted in Part II, supra, Judges must have several years of experience working in the
specialized tuna division of an auction house, and they often attend seminars about tuna held by the
Tuna and Swordfish Buyers Association. Most judges arc relatively young (between their early 30s and
mid-40s), because the auction houses see judging as an opportunity for them to tindy tune their
knowledge of tuna, get to know experts from other companies, and interact with buyers and TMG staff.
151. Such withdrawn cases are not included in the data presented in this paper. But they are
sufficiently rare--probably fewer than a dozen cases a year-that they would not affect my
conclusions.
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a venue for displaying and refining their expertise, and it allows buyers to
absolve themselves of any blame for the misfortune of having purchased a
damaged fish. As a consequence, good market relations are maintained and
order is preserved among those who participate daily in Tsukiji's tuna ex-
change.
Third, the Tuna Court reaffirms the relationships that are crucial to the
maintenance of a well-ordered marketplace by reducing the potential for
exploitation among buyers and sellers. Because the supply of and demand
for auctioned tuna fluctuates for a variety of reasons-fishing conditions,
economic conditions, the popularity of particular types and cuts of fish,
health warnings such as concern over mercury levels, and other factors-
the relative power of buyers and sellers also varies. 152 Without a generally
accepted method for handling disputes over quality, one can easily imagine
that buyers would exert pressure on sellers for compensation during times
of high supply or low demand, and vice versa. If the settlement of disputes
changed in step with market conditions, so that whichever party had more
market power at a given moment could dictate the principles of compensa-
tion, conflict resolution would become little more than extortion, and the
emphasis placed on expert evaluation of damaged tuna would diminish.
The substitution of power for cooperation and expertise would damage the
atmosphere that enables the tuna auction to function successfully. Tsukiji's
conflict-resolution system regularizes the principles of disputing and con-
tributes to constancy in the balance of power between buyers and sellers,
which is crucial to the stability and hannony of their interactions.
Fourth. the Tuna COUli responds to and reaffimls a conception of fair-
ness that is shared by market participants, and in doing so it establishes a
way of managing conflict that traders have come to see as a natural and
desirable condition of the marketplace. Investigating and evaluating no-
tions of fairness is inevitably a difficult task, and so the data presented in
support of this claim is speculative. But in conversations with market par-
ticipants about dispute resolution at Tsukiji, a clear pattem emerged. When
interviewing tuna traders about the Tuna Court, I asked why they didn't
save the time and trouble engendered by the CUITent system by creating an
ex ante way of handling conflict, such as putting all the risk on buyers.
Buyers and sellers alike, as well as representatives from the TMG, invaria-
bly responded that they had a Tuna Court because it was the fair (k6sei)
152. When il comes \0 tuna. the laws of supply and demand must also take into account the
public's "taste" lor paliicular parts of the tuna. The fatty underbelly (!Oro). lor exam[Jlc. is now the
most cxj1enslve part l'fthe tuna. with a single sushi-sized bite sometimes costing uj1wards ofS20 But it
has not always been highly prized. During the Edo Period. it was considered 100 oily for those with
discriminating laste and was kfi for those who could not afford the '"better" pans of the fish. Uf.IJA.
.\"11/"'(/ note 12. at 179 For an analysis uf the formation and change of "taste" and its sociological
Significance. ,eL' PILRKr BlH"KDILli. DISTfNCTfO ': A Soc IAJ CIUTI\)I.:E ()r"1 HI' .iL.1D(;f:~1i:N·f ()r T.\STI...
( J9X4l
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way to handle the problem of defective fish. Further questioning revealed a
trio of concerns thought to be at the core of a fair system. Fairness, in the
view of those involved in Tsukiji's tuna trade, has several characteris-
tics: ( I) it requires a system of dispute resolution to handle the problem of
defective tuna, (2) it dictates that the financial loss caused by defective
fish be shared by buyers and sellers, and (3) it demands that similar prob-
lems should lead to similar price reductions. The existence of the Tuna
Court itself is part of what constitutes fairness. So too is the allocative
principle that underlies the adjudication of disputes-the principle that al-
lows a buyer's cost to be reduced by no more than half the value of the to-
tal damage. The fact that the likelihood of receiving the minimum or
maximum price reduction (recall that 57% of buyers received the I 1%
minimum or SOD;;) maximum) is much higher than any other resolution also
speaks to the shared view of fairness, since the problems that lead to com-
plaints are often subjective--how "off' is the color, how "bad" is the dis-
ease, how "tough" is the meat--which leads judges to make binary
decisions that a tuna's defect is either minor or catastrophic. 153 By creating
and using a system of dispute resolution that complies with, and continu-
ally reasserts, the view of fairness shared by market participants, market
relations remain positive, order is maintained, and tuna can be traded
quickly and efficiently.
Ultimately, dispute resolution at Tsukiji reflects as much the impor-
tance of local reason as that of universal rationality. The rules and proce-
dures ofTsukiji's Tuna Court are influenced by the logic of the market, but
they also bear the imprint of the needs, interests, and values of those who
participate in the tuna auction. Because buyers and sellers meet each other
daily and share an interest in quickly and profitably moving tuna from the
auction floor to the sushi counter, they want a working relationship that
maintains market order and minimizes tension. The Tuna Court is critical
to meeting that goal. When buyers wheel their tuna carts to the Tuna Court
and assert their right to compensation, and when representatives from the
five tuna auction houses examine their allegedly damaged goods, they are
engaged in an ongoing process of fine-tuning the market relationships on
which the success of the tuna trade depends.
Still, there are limits to the utility of frequent and intense disputing. At
some point, conf1ict can morph from a builder of community to a threat to
the very values it so effectively bolsters. Although Tsukiji's "Accident
Inspection Place" manifests many of the attributes of public courts, there-
fore, those whose lives are rooted in the market are conscious of the
153. The II %-50% range is a relatively mild, community-preserving remedy, unlike an "all or
nothing" resolution that might reduce the effectiveness of the Tuna Court as a builder of market
relations. Email from Robert Kagan. Professor, University ofCalifomia. Berkeley (Feb. 2005) (on file
with author).
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potential threat legal conflict poses to the marketplace. As a result, they
deemphasize the formal nature of their disputes and thc commonalities be-
tween their tuna "inspection place" and a courthouse. My research at
Tsukiji was punctuated by a reculTing question from those I inter-
viewed: what could an American law professor possibly find interesting
enough about the tuna trade to lead him to hang around a cold, wet corner
of the marketplace during the pre-dawn hours? When I responded to one of
my questioners, a Tuna Court judge, by saying that I was interested in the
legal nature of Tsukiji's dispute process, he immediately disagreed. "This
doesn't have any legal significance" (horitsuteki imi ga nai) he shot back.
"We are just five guys talking" (go-nin no aida no hanashi dake da YO).154
Likewise, in one of my first discussions about the Court with the Director
of the Omono Gyokai (Tuna and Swordfish Buyers Association), 1 used a
Japanized version of the English word "claim" to describe the bringing of a
dispute to Court. He quickly COlTected me. When a buyer appeals a case, he
explained, the buyer is making a "claim" (he used the word kuremu); ini-
tially, buyers are only asking that "accidents" (jiko) be evaluated.
Those conversations point to a fifth way the Tuna Court serves to cre-
atc and preserve order among tuna tradcrs. While it provides an official,
state-sponsored outlet for blowing off steam, reaffirming expertise, balanc-
ing power among traders, and articulating a shared view of fairness, the
nature of the Tuna Court allows buyers and sellers to think of themselves
as engaged in a purely infol111aL in-house process. Although in general
people in Japan will go to court when it is in their interest to do so, the cal-
culation of the costs and benefits of formal disputing is not simply an actu-
arial exercise. Among tuna traders (and many others), going to court has a
strongly negative connotation. As in Thailand, where a colloquial expres-
sion holds that it is better "to eat dogshit than to go to court,"!5" courts in
Japan arc often said to be acrimonious, relationship-ending, time-
consuming places. That view is at least in part a legacy of a long-standing
government policy to delegitimize the courts, which it saw as contributing
to social disintegration. In an effort to ensure that "Japanese morals rather
than law" shaped the resolution of disputes, for example, the govel11ment
enacted a variety of prewar laws that required many types of conflicts to be
handled by extrajudicial conciliation.I"1l
154. Interview with \11'. Matsllzaki Hidehiko. Tuna Section. Dai-ichi Suisan ('(1. Ltd .. in Tsukiji
Market. Japan (1)('(' 6.2004) (on tile with author).
155. DAVID ENGEL, CODI: .,\;-.,n CLSTO~J 1'0 A THAI PROVI"'CIAL COUR']: TI-II' bTERACTj()N OJ
FORMAL ANI) INI'ORMAL SYSI DIS OF Jl'STICF 9R (197RJ. discllssed in Marc Galanler. ,..tdjuJie(J/iol7,
I.irigalioll, and R"I{J/"d PhI/1I0/lWIII.I. ill LA W A 'On TH E SOCIAL SCIEr-:l'ES 151 (Leon Lipson & Stanton
Wheeler eds .. )9!<6)
156, John Owen Haley. Th" Poillies of Informal Jus/ice: 7171/ Japanese ErjJ"rience, 1922- I 'J42. in
TH E PUll I Il:> 0\. h FORM \ I. .IUSTIl r. \<)1.. 2. at 125-':+7 (R ichard L. Abel ed .. 1982 l, Recent sUJ'\'CY data
suggests Ihat the public 110 longer has strongly negative kel ings about litigation: hut that data fails tn
intenogate members of close-Kill I L'olllll1ercial groups. or any other close-Knit groups. aboul their
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Moreover. the most common Japanese word for court, s'Uihol1sho, has
a decidedly official, judicial meaning. Unlike the llbcral use of the word
"court" in English to refer to a variety of di fferent types of disputc-
resolution mechanisms, saibunsho clearly references one of the hierarchi-
cally organized bodies administered by the Supreme Court Secretariat. The
TMG ordinance that established the Tuna Court does not use the word for
court, and Tsukiji's tuna traders disclaim the association between the Tuna
Court and a "real" court, at least in part because it would be misleading in
Japanese to call Tsukiji's dispute-resolution body a saibonsho, since it
clearly exists outside of the Secretariat's administrative domain.
Consequently, the tuna traders have the best of both worlds-they can le-
gitimately deny that their dispute-resolution institution is a court but at the
same time enjoy the benefit of an efficient government-run, conflict-
resolving body, which saves them from the potential complications of pri-
vate bargaining.
In that way, the Tuna Court provides traders with an elegant solution
to their conflicts. By offering an in-house system for adjudicating claims, it
eliminates the time and trouble of bringing their cases to the official courts,
and at the same time obviates the potential discomfort of having to find
more personal, private solutions to their disputes. ls7 By keeping their
claims local, tuna traders can defang the existence of face-to-face conflict
and instead define their disputes as simply routine discussions of technical
"accidents" that are necessary to arrive at the appropriate price adjustment.
Likewise, the pursuit of a price reduction is not ariiculated as the assertion
of a right to compensation but rather as a mutual quest for consistent re-
sults. In essence, the Tuna Court enables tuna traders to deny the existence
of frequent disputing in their workplace and instead allows them to empha-
size their membership in a cohesive trading community, where the inherent
nature of the product brings about certain problems with quality that are
nobody's fault and that can be quickly and consensually resolved.
Packaged in non-disputatious terms, the Court poses a minimal threat to
the social order of the tuna traders and instead highlights the informal, con-
sensual, and personal nature of market relationships. This further stabilizes
the tuna marketplace.
"The Shasta County evidence," writes Ellickson, "indicates that
people are aware that the legal system is a relatively costly system of
dispute resolution and therefore often choose to turn a deaf ear to it."lsX [n
attitudes toward bringing their co-members to courts. See ShihiJ Seido Kaikaku Shingikai [Justice
System Rdorm Council], Minji Sosho Riyosha Chosa: Hokusho [Report ofa Survey of Civil Litigation
Use] (Dec. 2000). some results of which are discussed in Haley, supra note 138, at 128. An account of
the government's continuing effort to delegitimize the courts can be found in UPHAM, supra note 10.
157. In essence. the choice between law and norms is there lore in part a function of culture, since
it will renect the degree to which different groups are more or less comfortable with private bargaining.
15R. EI.L1CKSO, supra note I, at 281.
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contrast, the Tuna Court is in almost perfect harmony with the needs of
market participants. The Court's durability and vitality cuts against the
grain of theories predicting that ove11 conflict between closely linked par-
ties shatters relationships. 159 At Tsukiji, the airing and resolving of disputes
is critical to the connections binding tuna merchants. Moreover, in contrast
to the received wisdom that members of close-knit merchant communities
generally find informal norms of managing conflict more efficient than
fonl1al legal rules,160 Tokyo's tuna traders use formal rules and institutions
to resolve their disputes. The heavy reliance on the formal, state-created
Tuna Court neither obliterates the possibility of long-term cooperation nor
inhibits the flow of tuna through the marketplace. To the contrary, it pro-
vides evidence that in Japan and perhaps elsewhere, carefully designed,
highly specialized, government-operated courts may be an effective way of
handling conflict that arises in distinct merchant communities. As the op-
eration of the Tuna Court makes clear, such courts can quickly and inex-
pensively handle a high volume of cases, and at the same time contribute to
the maintenance of an ordered marketplace.
159. Yngvesson offers a useful summary of that literature: "Conventional Ivisuo!ll and !lluch social
sCience research tell us that people who are involved in continuing relations will hancile connict
through procedures which emphasize reconciliation and mutually agreed upon decisions. '\:lorc !"ormal
procedures---typically official government or other public tribunals--arc avoided_ since thcir use may
escalate connic! and endanger the relationship'-' Barbara Yngvesson. Re-Exall/ining COl1linllin,l!.
Relarions and rhe Ll.J\\·, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 623. 624 (1985) For additional insights on continuing
relationships and the law. see MAX GI.UCKMAN. THE JUDICIAL PIWCFSS AM()~(; "IHF B..\R<JlSI. OF
'ORTH ERN RHODESIA (1955); Marc GalanteI'. l"ision l.Jnd R('l'isiol}' A COIl1!11l'm 01} fngl'<'sson. I <)~:'
WIS. L. REV. 647 (I <)R'i): Merry. slIpra note 135
I hO. For a discussion of nonns. law. and d'ficiency. sec Mahoney & Sanchirico. I'll/lUI ;lote 6.
